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Abstract
The possible impact of management practices on unemployment has been little
explored. Normally, those practices voluntarily adopted by competitive firms are
considered likely to improve their performance and thus their long term scope to
provide jobs. Yet there are a number of areas where such management practices
could adversely affect jobs.
The paper starts by examining management practices and wage rigidity, reviewing
some of the links, such as various forms of implicit contract, problems of low trust,
and the influence of social norms. It then explores the issues of working time
arrangements and management reasons limiting flexible hours. Training and internal
labour markets are another important area of management policies.
New production philosophies, such as 'lean production' and 'total quality
management' are examined for their effects upon employment structure, and evidence
is reviewed on their extent.
The paper concludes by looking at current high levels and persistence of
unemployment in the European Union, and explores the degree to which it could be
due to a lack of functional flexibility within the firm. With relatively high job tenures
and lacking such flexibility, European firms would be less well placed to adapt to
external shocks, and so more reluctant to hire new labour.
This paper accompanies a similar paper by the same author on industrial relations
practices and unemployment.
This paper was produced as part of the Centre's 
Programme on Industrial Relations.-ii-
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MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
David Marsden
1. Introduction
Much of the debate about the impact of labour market institutions on unemployment
has focused on unions and collective bargaining. After a decade or more of declining
union membership and of receding coverage of collective agreements across most
OECD countries, and during which unemployment has risen considerably, it is
important to examine firms' employee management practices, and to attempt to trace
out their impact. This may highlight new policy areas where governments, in
collaboration with firms, can seek to reduce the current high levels of unemployment,
and to alter its structure.
Research on the extent of management practices within different OECD economies
is very limited compared even with that on union practices. Case studies provide
only limited clues as to possible generalisation, often giving only an impressionistic
view of the critical economic variables, whereas large scale surveys provide only
fragmentary indicators whose interpretation is often controversial. Nevertheless, faced
with the limited success of macroeconomic policies, and of policies designed to
remove a number of labour market 'rigidities' to restore full employment, it is
worthwhile looking at the possible contribution of the employee management policies
of firms.-2-
It may seem odd in a competitive economy that the management practices of firms
could contribute to unemployment. If prices and wages are flexible, and firms are
maximising profits, then they should normally hire as much labour as workers wish
to supply at the prevailing wage rates. If some firms discriminate against certain
categories of workers, for example, by not hiring older workers, then other firms can
make higher profits by taking them on. If some firms have very bureaucratic pay
systems which offer the same rate to all workers whatever their experience, and so
make it uneconomic to take on young workers, then other firms can make higher
profits by offering experience-rated pay scales and hiring young workers. Thus, it is
hard to see why employment practices freely adopted by firms, and which detract
from their performance, should persist in a competitive economy. Since other firms
can benefit by adopting the opposite policies, it is also hard to see why such practices
should to unemployment.
Part of the difficulty may arise from a tendency to treat the firm as 'black box' and
to abstract from the very real problems of enterprise management. In the competitive
long run in which information is freely available this may be legitimate. However,
enterprise management involves many problems in which information is incomplete,
incorporated in workers' practical skills, or is used in small group bargaining
relations.   Under such circumstances, management may work more by established
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conventions and 'rule of thumb', applying standard solutions to recurring problems.
Even in the absence of unions and legal rules, management may find a more
cooperative relationship with employees if it works by predictable, customary, rules
rather than changing continuously in response to external circumstances. Indeed, it
might be helpful to think of the firm not as combining different factors of production,
but rather as establishing a framework within cooperation may take place. The first
priority of employee management is to achieve successful cooperation without which
sales plans cannot be realised. To this end, management may develop practices one-3-
of whose side-effects is to aggravate unemployment.
This chapter focuses on four broad themes: the first concerns the management
contribution to the some of the 'labour market rigidities' highlighted in recent reviews
of the literature on unemployment (eg. Nickell 1990); the second concerns how
management practices may affect access to jobs for certain categories of workers, and
hence their ability to leave unemployment; the third concerns the potential impact of
some of the new management practices currently transforming firms in some major
sectors of employment. Since many of these practices are to be found in varying
degrees in all countries, the fourth section takes a comparative look at the experience
of some different countries to ask whether their incidence helps to explain some of
the more notable inter-country differences in unemployment behaviour. Finally, it
addresses some areas of policy.
Management policies are likely to have their greatest direct effect upon movements
into and out of employment as a result of their hiring and lay-off decisions. Hiring
policies relate obviously to hiring decisions, but they are also affected by firms'
remuneration policies, and by the internal management of their human resources.
Thus, a number of policy areas emerges which may be relevant to the unemployment
problem in a number of ways:-4-
rigid pay systems
a) management's remuneration policies may be geared to ensuring the motivation of
current employees rather than responding to external labour market pressures;
b) their remuneration policies may also be inconsistent with employment openings
for certain workers (eg. bureaucratic pay scales with rates of pay tied to individual
jobs may militate against young persons' employment);
c) remuneration policies may reflect cultural norms in different countries which may
be adverse to flexibility;
rigid patterns of working time
d) the way production is organised may make it easier to lay workers off rather than
vary hours of work;
e) rapid lay-off policies in a down-turn may increase the probability of a person's
entry into long-term unemployment, especially for those above a certain age;
greater stress on internal labour markets
f) by making skills more firm-specific they increase the difficulty of finding a new job
once someone becomes unemployed;
g) employment guarantees given by firms may make access to certain types of long-
term jobs very difficult for certain categories (eg. young workers in a recession);-5-
h) hiring policies may be geared to the employment of particular kinds of workers,
and these may differ from those with conventional vocational skills;
i) some employment policies may boost the informal bargaining power of 'insiders'
at the expense of 'outsiders' whether or not the former are unionised;
discriminatory hiring policies
j) discriminatory perceptions and hiring (eg. older workers and women);
influence of new management philosophies
k) a systematic search for productivity improvements may involve systematic
reductions of employment (eg. under the pursuit of 'lean production' in order to
remain competitive);
internal organisational barriers to flexibility.
l) management principles governing the internal structure of firms could militate
against adjustment.
These factors are likely to be contributory rather than actual causes of unemployment.
No systematic attempt is made to explain why new firms should not develop using
different practices and mop up the unemployed. However, by looking at management
practices, it becomes clear that enterprise management is a complex skill that has to
be learned. Some of the more abstract of these skills can be taught in business
schools, but a great deal is learned on the job and the knowledge is contained in
work teams, each member of which knows how to work with the others. One has to-6-
bring together the right mix of skills and build a suitable team of employees.
Adopting new employment practices usually involves developing a new set of
organisational skills: the difficulties in adopting 'lean production' and 'TQM'
discussed later are a good illustration. New practices can of course emerge, but it
takes time, whereas responding to a new commercial opportunity has to be done
quickly. Thus, although the influx of new firms or firms with different practices more
geared to absorbing unemployment is an important theoretical possibility, there are
a number of important practical difficulties. It is therefore worth taking seriously the
potential impact of current management practices on unemployment.
In addition, a number of recent aggregate studies of unemployment in OECD
countries have shown a great diversity among countries (eg. Layard, Nickell and
Layard 1991, Blanchard and Summers 1986, Alogoskoufis and Manning 1988, and
Calmfors and Driffil 1988). These have generally highlighted the need to look at the
workings of labour markets in different countries, and notably at their institutional
structures. Hence the importance of a comparative perspective also on the
management side.
2. Management practices and wage rigidity
Much of the discussion of downward nominal wage rigidity has tended to focus on
the impact of collective bargaining. However, the prevalence of such practices is
much wider. In his famous study of personnel policies in large non-union firms in
the United States, Foulkes (1980) showed that such firms practised a wide range of
remuneration policies which would also be conducive to downward wage rigidity.
Being large firms at a time of union decline, it is unlikely that the policies were
simply a 'spill over' effect from the unionised sector. Indeed, the widespread-7-
insensitivity of wages to labour market fluctuations both geographically and
historically forces us to look seriously at the employer interest in such policies.
There is also a long-running strand in empirical research on wage differentials which
stresses the importance of managerial policy and within-firm notions of equity as
sources of wage rigidity in the face of labour market changes. In the US in the 1940s
and 1950s, for example, Slichter (1950) argued that the importance of internal
management policies on wage differentials explained the tendency for unskilled
hourly wages to be higher in firms where skilled hourly wages were high, wage bills
were low in relation to income, and where profits per dollar of sales were high.
Reynolds (1951) stressed the difficulty for firms to lower their wage position in a local
labour market because of likely loss of morale among existing employees. More
recently, in the UK, Nolan and Brown (1983) similarly observed the dominance of
firm-specific influences on wage increases over external labour market pressures,
which they attributed in part of the spread of job evaluation and work study
techniques, both of which stress firm-specific as opposed to labour market
considerations. Of particular relevance for the current debate about industry
bargaining and unemployment, Nolan and Brown attributed part of the increased
scope for management policies to the decline of industry bargaining. The firms in
their sample were not using it as an opportunity to become more responsive to local
labour market pressures, but rather to focus on internal management problems.
Daubigney et al. (1971) similarly observed a significant influence of management
policy on firms' wage positions in their local labour markets in France. Indeed, much
of the recent empirical work on 'efficiency wages' and non-compensating wage
differentials (eg. Lang and Leonard 1987) could be interpreted as indicating the
importance of management policy in the setting of within-firm pay levels and pay
structures as distinct from external labour market pressures.-8-
Four main types of theoretical argument concerning enterprise remuneration policies
deserve consideration: the first is that most employees want stable wages; the second
the difficulties of agreeing viable systems of variable pay under conditions of low
trust; the third concerns organisational and administrative problems facing firms; and
the fourth, the balance between internal and external pressures on firms'
remuneration policies.
contract theories
The reason firms might offer fixed rates of pay rather than ones that vary with
business conditions has been addressed in the contract theories of 'implicit contracts'
and 'efficiency wages'. According to the 'implicit contract' theories of pay rigidity,
employers even out fluctuations in the demand for, and the market value of,
employees' output by paying a constant wage rate. Stiglitz (1984) presented the firm
as offering a dual contract: an employment contract in which the wage varied with
the employee's marginal value product, and an insurance contract. In good times,
employees' output was worth more than their wage, and the firm took the difference
as an insurance premium. Conversely, in bad times, the firm paid out. Employees
valued such contracts because the bulk of their assets were concentrated in their
human capital (their skills) and so they could not spread their risks to the same
degree as could firms. The theory sheds some light on why firms might offer fix-
wage contracts in order to attract workers, but as a more general theory of
unemployment, it has not been successful in explaining why workers should prefer
stable wages rather than stable employment (eg. Nickell 1990). Moreover, there is no
evidence of any such explicit clauses in employment contracts and collective
agreements whereas many similar issues, such as profit sharing, are the subject of
extensive joint regulation.-9-
Efficiency wage models offer another reason why firms might offer stable wages,
again with the implication that that wages will not fall to market-clearing levels. At
their simplest, firms offer pay rates above the competitive market rate in order to
have an additional sanction against poor performance. In a world of costlessly
transferable skills, dismissed workers can simply find another job at the same rate of
pay in another firm. However, if the firm offers above this rate, then dismissal
involves loss of the higher level of pay. Firms might wish to offer such pay levels for
jobs where the exercise of employee discretion leads to higher job performance, and
therefore where management find it difficult to monitor the quality of work directly.
An alternative view, advanced by Akerlof (1982), is that the higher rate of pay
induces a feeling of reciprocity among its recipients so that they work with greater
care and assiduity: hence the analogy with 'gift exchange'. Thus firms might adopt
such remuneration policies either to strengthen discipline or to induce commitment.
Either way, ceasing to become a 'high wage employer' as a result of loss of markets,
or local unemployment, could be difficult. Under the first hypothesis, the disciplinary
sanction is lost, and under the second, reciprocity may be undermined, and in both
cases, there could be a loss of performance among the workforce. One might argue
that so long as the relative wage differential were maintained, then the firm would
be alright. The problem is that employers are generally better informed than workers
about the state of both product and labour markets so the employer's claims would
have to be taken on trust. Under the disciplinary argument, clearly there is little trust
involved so it would be all the harder to convince workers of the need for pay
flexibility. Under the second, that of reciprocity, there may be more ground for trust,
and hence stronger grounds for expecting nominal flexibility, but it may still be
difficult for the employers to convince their employees of their good faith. 
In the scenarios of more complex theories of pay and incentives, such as that of
Lazear (1981) for rising earnings profiles it may be more difficult still to obtain pay-10-
flexibility. In Lazear's model, firms offer a pay profile rising with age or length of
service starting below the value of the employee's output, and finishing above it at
the end of the person's career. Employees with such pay systems invest a
considerable stake in the organisation in the form of their low remuneration in early
years which they then stand to lose if they are subsequently dismissed for poor
performance. As large organisations will have many such profiles for different
categories of employees, it is easy to see that managing pay flexibility by category
would become very problematic.
wage fixity and low trust
Both the implicit contract and efficiency wage theories of wage fixity shed an
important light on the underlying difficulty of achieving variable pay systems in a
low trust environment, which is what contract theory generally assumes. If workers
do not wholly trust their employers' reports of business conditions, and the resulting
fluctuations in the value of their output, then it is hard to imagine that a system of
pay linked to output value would prove acceptable: hence the interest in rate for the
job rules discusses in the industrial relations chapter (§2.1). Under such conditions,
because cutting jobs means cutting output and thus profits it also hurts the employer,
so the incentive to provide false information is less. In contrast, merely announcing
that business is bad and proposing a wage cut costs nothing, and the incentive for
the employer to be over-pessimistic is far greater. Thus, in a low trust environment,
employees are likely to insist upon a fixed rate of pay tied to units of work that are
easily observed.
organisational reasons for fixity-11-
Organisational and administrative reasons for paying fixed wages also hinge on
problems of information and trust. In making pay vary according to performance,
firms are not just concerned with external market issues, but also with the
measurement of their employees' performance. The empirical literature on
performance appraisal and merit or performance related pay highlights the extreme
difficulty of measuring employee performance in many work environments (eg
Milkovitch and Wigdor 1991). Because measurement which is perceived by
employees as being unfair or inaccurate can damage work motivation, firms have a
strong incentive to limit the weight they attach to performance pay systems (Bishop
1987). In practice, therefore, it is very common for performance payments to be
allocated on conventional lines such as inflation, length of service, or by rota, and for
ratings to be only slightly differentiated. Foulkes (1980) argued that such problems
were a common reason for merit pay in his sample of large non-union companies not
functioning in the way it was intended to.
Other administrative problems concern such questions as the complications of
managing pay systems which are highly differentiated among employees and which
might engender a great deal of individual bargaining, or appeals against employer
decisions. These would involve a great deal of management time.
conflicting objectives
Pay systems have to achieve a wide variety of tasks for firms, and it is inevitable that
these should periodically conflict. Solow (1980) argued that this was one cause of
'wage stickiness'. In particular, pay policies designed to 'recruit and retain' may
conflict with those required to motivate.
A number of the empirical studies of internal labour markets (eg. Mackay et al. 1969,-12-
Robinson ed. 1970, Marsden 1982) have highlighed the importance of internal pay
relativities within the enterprise for regulating flows of labour, and that recruitment
into internal labour markets generally takes place through a limited number of ports
of entry. The latter provide the main points of contact with competing pay rates on
local labour markets, beyond which, internal relativities become more influential.
Thus employers come to give greater weight to the internal pressures on their wage
structures than to external pressures. This will generate a considerable degree of
inertia vis-à-vis local labour market pressures.
Many of the above arguments relate to policies which would be adopted by some
firms, and for some groups of workers only. Efficiency wages and the pay profiles
discussed by Lazear are generally attributed to the costs of monitoring the quality of
work. There is no reason why they should apply to jobs where output is easily
measured, or where there is close supervision, for example. It will be argued later
than new management methods are reducing the importance of such routine jobs and
thereby increasing the need for employee discretion. But this situation is still far from
being universal. 
There is no reason to believe that these are uniform across all types of employment.
Quite the contrary. They therefore offer a better explanation of the incidence of
unemployment. Their impact on the overall level of unemployment would depend
upon the behaviour of other firms, and whether they could take up the slack.
We have then a number of reasons why firms should adopt pay systems which are
insensitive to labour market conditions, and thus why they eschew dropping pay to
'market clearing' levels, even in the absence of unions and collective bargaining. There-13-
are some additional reasons relating to beliefs which, it appears, are deeply
embedded in our societies.
3. Social norms of fairness and managerial policies
It was suggested earlier that one reason why firms insulated their employees' wages
from labour market fluctuations was that the latter lacked the range of assets over
which they could spread the risks involved. This is an interesting but rather narrow
view. Wider social norms may also militate against firms offering market sensitive
pay (eg. Solow 1990).
In a recent study of fairness in economic transactions in the United States,
Kahnemann et al. (1986) found that the great majority of ordinary people were
resistant to the idea that providers of services should raise their prices in response
to an increase in demand. Equally, they rejected as unfair the idea that an employer
should be able to cut the pay of incumbent workers simply because of an increase in
available labour. In contrast, changing prices to pass on higher costs was accepted,
as was taking on new hires at a new, lower, market rate. Because of the small sample,
one can only take such work as suggestive, but it would seem that pay flexibility in
response to labour market conditions is not widely accepted among ordinary people.
Indeed, it is quite the contrary. Work in progress by Bewley and Brainard (1993),
which reaches similar conclusions, may take this further.
These studies point in the same direction as earlier work in the United Kingdom by
Behrend (1964 and 1966) on 'price images' acquired by both consumers and workers
which were often learned earlier in life, and subsequently served as criteria for
judging the acceptability of actual prices. Such images clearly impart a degree of-14-
inertia in people's perceptions of fair or reasonable prices.
Several writers have commented that firms may fear that downward wage flexibility
could damage employee morale (eg. Reynolds 1951). Equally, use of incentive
payments in order to respond to labour market pressures may often be resented by
employees. A recent study of the impact of performance related pay on motivation
in the British tax service revealed that a large majority of the staff thought it unfair
to use performance pay awards in order to retain staff whose skills were in short
supply but who gave only average performance (Marsden and Richardson 1994). In
another example, in 1990, Dupont had to cancel the profit sharing programme in its
fibres unit because of discontent among its employees when it appeared that they
would lose up to 4% of their basic salary as a result of a drop in sales (Cascio, 1992:
445) .
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All of these examples would seem to illustrate the absence of any widespread
acceptance among employees that their pay should vary according to labour market
conditions or that prosperity of their employer. Hence, to some extent at least, it
would seem that employers are reacting to employee preferences for stable pay in the
face of economic fluctuations. Such forces add to the elements of price and wage
stickiness which Nickell (1990) identified as contributing to unemployment.
4. Management practices and working time arrangements.
A potentially attractive alternative to adapting labour costs by means of varying wage
rates or by lay-off which has attracted much discussion has been that of variable
working time arrangements. Overtime working is a long-established, and widely
accepted, means for increasing the supply of labour to firms to deal with short-run-15-
increases in demand. Indeed, many surveys of employers' reactions to labour
shortages indicate that they consider variations in working time are easier to
implement than changes in wage rates, which are usually well down their list of
priorities (eg. Hunter 1978).
There are additional theoretical reasons for believing that short-term working time
changes should be easier to implement than changes in pay. Several of the arguments
about wage inflexibility work differently in the case of working time. For example,
many of the problems arising from asymmetric information stressed by such writers
as Stiglitz are less severe in the case of working time. Whereas cutting pay may
actually enhance profits, so that an employer's pessimism is rewarded, in the case of
cutting working hours, output also has to be cut. As employers have many
overheads, there is less incentive to cut hours more than necessary. In addition,
cutting hours has the appearance of sharing hardship, which would accord well with
the norms of reciprocity cited by Akerlof, and those of fairness highlighted by
Kahnemann et al.
Another factor favouring hours flexibility is that it can help to maintain the integrity
of the effort-bargain. One of the big problems facing management as business
conditions fluctuate is that efficiency and effort levels tend to decline when the firm's
demand for work declines. If hours remain constant, then workers have to work at
a lower intensity. The difficulty then is to raise standards again when output
increases. Varying hours may make it easier to maintain a constant standard of
working. 
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There are, however, a number reasons which are likely to limit the use of hours
variability. First, overtime hours may be less productive than normal hours. It has
been argued that the premium rates paid for overtime hours reflect their higher pay-16-
rates (eg. Feldstein, 1967 for the UK), however, other estimates, also for the UK,
taking more account of conditions in individual industries, set the productivity of
overtime hours at about 60% of that of normal hours (Leslie and Wise, 1980). The
latter estimates seem more plausible in view of the greater likelihood of fatigue, and
that people might 'spin out' work in order to make overtime necessary. Also in the
UK, there has been a common practice of using overtime hours to raise the earnings
of certain categories without raising their basic rates of pay (NBPI 1970), often
because to do so would require wider alteration of pay systems or pay agreements.
Administrative cost may also limit variability of hours, particularly in large,
integrated plants and organisations. There are also other costs to employers,
frequently noted during periods of short-time working. Namely, workers who can get
full week working elsewhere may decide to leave so that the firm is slowly depleted
of those with the most marketable skills. From the firm's point of view, if skilled
workers have greater seniority, then LIFO systems with full week working protect
them from this kind of loss.
Thus the probable declining marginal productivity of overtime hours and difficulties
of labour retention may limit recourse to hours flexibility, despite their greater
feasibility than pay flexibility. These factors may however become less important if
there is a gradual drift towards internal labour market type arrangements, at least for
key workers (see below), and away from professional or occupational markets, and
as shorter working time generally reduces the likelihood of fatigue diminishing the
productivity of marginal overtime hours.
Variations in hours of work appear to offer a greater buffer against unemployment
in Japan than in many other countries. JEPA (1992, p. 193) highlights the greater
variability of hours worked in Japan as compared with Germany and the US.-17-
Hashimoto and Raisian (1988) argue that the main reason is that in Japan blue collar
workers are engaged under salaried conditions, and so extra hours do not entitle
workers to additional payments. Why Japanese workers should appear not to require
financial incentives for extra hours unlike those in other countries may be explained
by the use of different types of pay incentives (see § 7 below). 
5. Training, internal labour markets and access to jobs
The development of enterprise internal labour markets (ILMs) can have a profound
influence on the incidence of unemployment, and if they are very widespread,
probably also on levels of unemployment because of the increased difficulty of
finding another suitable job (and hence longer unemployment duration).
Because their existence implies a high cost in replacing incumbent employees it has
been widely argued that they contribute to 'insider' pressures. Such costs create a
margin within which 'insiders' can negotiate higher pay thus causing employers to
rein back employment levels (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
Internal labour markets have been variously defined, but they might be said to exist
for certain jobs when a firm regularly fills vacancies for those jobs from among its
current employees. Associated with internal labour markets therefore will be a
concentration of recruitment from outside the enterprise through certain ports of
entry, and commonly also, upgrading between job levels within the enterprise.
There is much controversy about the coverage of internal labour markets, their degree
of openness or closedness to external job applicants, and their causes. Although they
have been widely associated with union presence, it would seem that unions are-18-
neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause. Many features of internal labour market
conditions were to be found, for example, in the large American non-union firms
surveyed by Foulkes (1980), and they are common in parts of national civil services
from which collective bargaining is excluded.
The various explanations for the development of internal labour markets give some
clue as to the nature of the employment difficulties associated with them. There are
six broad classes of management interest in internal labour markets which might lead
to their adoption even in the absence of union pressures.
a) ILMs and on-the-job-training
Skill development on the job, when the resulting skills are not available on local
labour markets, causes firms to develop internal labour markets (Doeringer and Piore,
1971). Many organisations require skills that are not available outside, and so have
to be developed internally. Firms will often adapt even standardised technology to
their own production needs so that it becomes effectively custom-built after a period
of use. As a result, the jobs related to it, and the skills required become unique, or
'specific', to the enterprise. Since there is often a degree of overlap between the
knowledge required for such jobs, it becomes economical for firms to organise job
progression so that on-the-job learning is progressive. As a result, firms develop
promotion ladders along which workers may progress. Thus, one reason why firms
might seek to develop internal labour markets even in the absence of union pressure
is that they offer an economical way of organising skill development for their
workforces. To reduce the capital loss suffered by the firm from labour turnover, it
may then set up other incentives to encourage worker attachment, such as seniority
wage payments, and seniority protection against lay-offs in bad times.-19-
Doeringer and Piore's analysis of ILMs has always attracted a degree of scepticism
because of the relatively short time required to learn most semi-skilled blue collar
jobs, and the ability of factories using such labour to absorb large numbers of
workers from other sectors. This pushes the second element of their explanation to
the fore, namely the role of collective bargaining in codifying and consolidating ILM
practices. In terms of the current debate about unemployment, this would tend to
place such ILMs among the practices designed to protect 'insiders'.
However, recent work on skills and productivity in Japan and East Asia has
highlighted an additional component of skill development: the competencies
developed in tackling job-related problems. Doeringer and Piore's model stressed skill
development in stable industrial environments where workers learned skills for
routine tasks. In contrast, the Japanese research has emphasised the role of OJT in
adapting to new work demands that emerge as firms adapt to market change.
Tackling 'unusual operations' as distinct from routine ones enlarges workers' skills
and their intellectual capacities for problem solving. For minor problems, this is often
more efficient than calling in specialist engineers and technicians because problems
are dealt with more quickly, often by preventive action. Workers on the job have a
great deal of contextual knowledge that is relevant for problem solving, and for
improving production efficiency. However, this requires broader based jobs and more
systematic job rotation than was the case for traditional ILMs. It also requires stable
employment, without which such skills cannot be built up.   Koike and Inoke (1990),
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comparing Japanese, Thai and Malaysian plants with similar technology, and
controlling for work effort and the availability of expert help, argue that the great
productivity advantage of the Japanese plants derived from their pattern of work
organisation and skill development.
The stress on human capital factors underlying internal labour markets has received-20-
recent support from the finding that employment stability was correlated with
training incidence across a range of countries for which suitable data were available,
notably in France and the United States (OECD 1993 Ch.4 §4).
b) ILMs and cooperative work relations
Inducing more cooperative work relations where workers have significant individual
bargaining power has been another factor behind the development of ILMs
(Williamson 1975). Internal labour markets may be offered by the firm to its
employees in order to create a long term stake in its success. Williamson also saw job
specificity as a problem, but not one of skill. Rather, job specificity meant that
workers were much better informed about the nature of their work, and the effort
and skill needed to accomplish it, than their employers. Workers might then take
advantage of the information asymmetry to bargain opportunistically, pressing a
short-term advantage for a short-term gain. Such small group bargaining pressures
exist in all organisations, whether or not they are unionised (eg. Crozier 1963). To
prevent such behaviour from dragging down the firm's performance, management
needs to create incentives for workers to forego their short-term advantage and to
seek to participate in the long-term success of their firm. Thus, Williamson argued
that firms would offer long term employment, promotion runs, seniority rules, and
similar devices, in order to encourage workers to take a long-term view.
c) Management policies on work organisation
Management might also change work organisation in order to provide internal labour
market conditions for certain categories of workers in order to reduce labour turnover
among groups with transferable skills, and to increase their commitment to the firm-21-
(Osterman, 1982). Skill specificity, in this case, is not given, but is a deliberate creation
of management policy. In Japan, Taira (1970) argued that Japanese firms in the heavy
industries had adopted this strategy during the 1920s in order to reduce labour
turnover.   In the US, in a study of two occupations normally with transferable skills,
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secretaries and computer programmers, Osterman (1982) argued that employers
sought to concentrate important tasks involving discretion on an élite of workers in
these occupations who would be given access to sensitive information and further
training, and to leave more routine professional type tasks to the remainder, who
could be hired externally. The first group would gain internal labour market type
employment conditions, whereas the second bringing only standard professional
skills to their work, would be given less security. Osterman shared with Williamson
the idea that firms would offer the stability of internal market conditions as an
incentive to workers to adopt a cooperative attitude to management. 
d) ILMs and functional flexibility
The development of functional flexibility has also been an important reason for
employers to develop internal labour markets. Generally, it is argued that employers
need to offer some degree of employment security if workers are to forego seniority
rules and job demarcations both of which provide a form of employment security.
Seniority rules provide predictability in lay-offs, and relative security for more senior
workers. Job demarcation rules support skill transferability by ensuring that job
vacancies in different firms maintain a high degree of consistency across firms. In
'salaried' internal labour markets, firms gain flexibility of labour utilisation, but at the
cost of having to provide a higher degree of employment security (Osterman, 1987,
and 1988). 
6-22-
e) ILMs and organisational competencies
Recently, a new stress has been given to the idea of firm-specific skills through the
recognition that the competitive advantage of firms lies in their ability to do
particular things as well as, or better than their competitors. Such abilities have been
described as 'organisational competencies' which have received a good deal of
attention in the management literature (eg. Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1993). For
example, Marks and Spencer trade on their reputation for providing inexpensive
good quality clothing, whereas another store would trade on its reputation for
unbeatable prices. To maintain its market position, Marks and Spencer have to
develop a set of management and staff development policies so that individual staff
do not undermine the M&S brand image by inappropriate behaviour. M&S's
organisational competence lies in sustaining the standards its customers come to
expect, such that unfriendly or badly trained staff, bad deliveries, or a decline in
stock or quality management might lead them to switch to another store. The skills
on which Marks and Spencer rely are generally not standardised labour market skills,
otherwise other stores could easily provide  the same distinctive service. Although
a good level of general education is required of recruits, the skills have a high
'contextual' or organisational component: learning the Marks and Spencer standards,
and how to work as a team with other M&S staff providing the same kind of service.
Many of the 'excellent' firms studied by Peters and Waterman (1982) displayed
similar organisational competencies which, it was argued, had contributed to their
market success.
The contextual skills that contribute to organisations' competencies have similar
implications for the formation of internal labour markets to the firm specific skills
analysed by Doeringer and Piore. The main difference is that in the former case, skills
were acquired primarily by experience on the job, and arose almost incidentally. In-23-
the latter case, management has to take a much more conscious line to ensure that
the right kinds of inter-personal and team skills are developed. Instead, they are
developed within the organisation by means of its own training programmes.
f) ILMs and local labour market structures
Finally, firms' dependence on ILMs may be determined by the types of skill available
on their local labour markets. Lorenz (1987) showed that, in the absence of the craft
labour markets available to British shipbuilders, their French counterparts had to
develop their own skills internally, and so developed their own ILMs. But there is
also a theoretical reason why firms tend to resort to internal labour market type
conditions for their skilled workers unless there already exist inter-firm occupational
labour markets.   Only when these exist do they really have a choice. According to
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this argument, such occupational markets, if they rely upon Becker's (1975) method
of cost-sharing for training for transferable skills, are balanced on a knife edge. Any
breakdown in cost-sharing (which for transferable skills means that the trainee has
to cover the whole cost of skill acquisition as the firm cannot recoup it from qualified
workers who can work elsewhere) will result in firms having to shoulder part of the
cost. According to studies of apprenticeship training costs in Britain and Germany
such costs are considerable.   This then creates a potential free rider problem as some
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employers will be tempted to poach skilled labour from elsewhere rather than
provide training. Hence, if firms that need transferable skills provide their own
training, they have a strong incentive to develop policies to attach those they have
trained, among which are measures to make the skills less transferable, or to spread
training over a longer period, giving the most valuable parts of training only at the
end when the worker is more settled in the firm.   Thus, again attachment is
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something fostered by management policy.-24-
6. Employment problems associated with employers' ILM policies.
All of these arguments have important implications for unemployment. Most
importantly, they all predict that it will be difficult for displaced ILM-skilled workers
to find equivalent employment in other firms. If their skills are specific, they have a
bundle of skills other employers cannot easily use, and which they may not readily
understand as job classifications vary from firm to firm. If the ILM is organised in
order to generate cooperative behaviour, then although the skills may be very similar
from one firm to another, external recruitment by the firm may undermine the very
motivation patterns the ILM was meant to encourage.
displaced workers
One of the ways in which ILMs contribute to unemployment is by the 'mis-match'
problems they generate. Displaced workers have acquired skills and work norms that
cannot easily be used, or are  not recognised, by other firms. One illustration of the
problem can be found in a comparison of the differential effect on skilled workers of
changing firms in France and Britain (Eyraud et al. 1990). In the French case, a
prevalence of ILMs meant that relatively more skilled workers who changed firms
had to take a semi- or unskilled job in their nre firms. This compared with Britain,
where a system of inter-firm occupational markets for skilled workers made such
occupational downgrading quite rare. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) estimate
that mis-match (by occupation, age, region and industry) accounted for about 40%
to UK unemployment levels in the mid-1980s, but that it had not increased much
during the previous ten years. A prevalence of ILMs could be expected to increase-25-
the persistence of unemployment especially among more senior workers.
employment of young workers
Internal labour markets may limit the employment opportunities for new entrants to
the labour market. Because firms have a strong incentive to react to a fall in demand
by cutting recruitment rather than by lay-offs, they will periodically expand and
contract the openings for young workers. Young workers who miss out on an
opening when they come of work age may well find it harder to find an internal
labour market job when conditions improve. Some recent research on individuals'
earnings over successive years indicates that such lost opportunities may well exert
a long term impact on the income and jobs of those affected (eg. Guillotin and
Gigard,1992).
employment problems of older workers
Older workers have been particularly hard affected by employment reductions in
recent years. At least part of this would seem to be due to the working of
employment and social security systems. They are also likely to find it much harder
to re-enter organisations which use internal labour markets.
They represent an easy target for job cuts for a number of reasons. Their skills may
often be less up to date than those of younger workers, and many employers appear
to believe, rightly or wrongly, that older workers are harder to train. Where firms use
rising age-salary profiles, older workers tend to be more expensive relative to
younger workers so that bigger labour cost savings can be made. Employers may also
prefer to offer early retirement to older workers because it has less of a destabilising-26-
effect upon other members of their workforces. Finally, in some countries, early
retirement enables the firm and those laid off to share the cost with the state.
The very attractiveness of older workers for employment reductions also increases
their difficulties of finding new work. Presumably, one reason, in Japan, why older
male workers, after their relatively early retirement, accept re-employment under
much less favourable conditions than previously is that alternative job opportunities
are greatly limited by the prevalence of internal labour markets.
insider power
The dependence of firms upon either specific skills or special patterns of motivation
derived from internal labour market policies provides an element of individual
bargaining power for employees. Indeed, the high cost for a firm of building a
reputation for employment stability (Foulkes 1988) and the difficulty of rebuilding
such a reputation once lost, mean that firms will be reluctant to abandon such
guarantees. Such factors can easily provide a source of 'insider' bargaining power,
even without the presence of unions.
Such insider power can be transformed into pay expectations which the employer
feels obliged to satisfy for fear of loss of workforce morale.   Being relatively
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insulated from local labour market pressures, workers on internal labour markets
could well be a source of wage pressures which damage the employment prospects
of other workers. Individual firms will tend to hire less labour, and the potential
inflationary impact may cause governments to run the economy at a more depressed
level.
Nevertheless, insider bargaining pressures may be mitigated by two factors. First,-27-
firms may develop their personnel policies to foster employee commitment. It is
noteworthy that many of Foulkes' large non-union firms with ILM conditions also
had active personnel policies designed to foster employee commitment. Secondly,
ILMs provide workers with a long-term stake in their firm's success, and this can
counterbalance the incentives to extract the maximum short-term gain from their
employer.
7. New production philosophies
The rise of mass production and its generalisation from the 1940s was particularly
employment friendly because of the small demands made on worker skills, and the
consequent ease with which people from different sectoral and skill backgrounds
could be integrated.
Apart from any influence on the demand for labour overall, technical change has
been associated with major changes in management and organisation. These can
influence the demand for different kinds of skills, the way in which skills are formed,
and access to training and subsequent skilled positions. In particular, it may affect the
balance between professional and enterprise based skills, and between intra-firm and
inter-firm employment adjustments.
These qualitative changes may affect overall unemployment levels only indirectly, but
they could have a more direct effect upon the dynamics, incidence, and consequences
of unemployment.
Three broad views of the consequences of technical and organisational have been
developed in this area, and all focus on the departure of industrial societies from the-28-
era of mass production to different types of production system. 
For all three, mass production had a number of key characteristics: large-scale
production units relying on economies of scale in production which made it
economical to employ large amounts of dedicated capital equipment. Each machine
would undertake one simple operation, and often that operation would be specific
to a particular model, for example, stamping bodies for one particular model of
automobile. Retooling for production of a different model was usually a complicated
and expensive process to be undertaken only infrequently. On the labour side, work
was finely divided into a set of operations which most people could master after a
very short time.
Perfected as a method of organisation in the automobile industry, hence the
expression 'fordism', many attributes of the system of work organisation were to be
found in other industries, indeed, many aspects of Henry Ford's mass production
system were already to be found in the food processing industries before his time.
Elements of the model were also applied in the services sectors. For example, the
reforms of the United States Federal Civil Service of the 1920s were strongly influence
by the ideas of scientific management (Milkovitch and Wigdor 1991), and recent
research in France illustrates how strong the division between tasks of conception and
organisation and those of execution is even in such areas as engineering development
work (Maurice et al.1988).
Although a highly efficient production system, it did contain a number of
dysfunctions which proved increasingly costly over time. First, the heavy investment
in dedicated capital equipment and in many small but discrete packages of skill (for
each individual job category) meant that the system was very vulnerable to
fluctuations in business conditions so that employment stability was hard to achieve.-29-
In some countries, such as the United States, greater predictability for workers could
be obtained by means of 'last in first out' seniority rules for lay-offs, but these in
many ways further reduced any flexibility of labour deployment (Katz 1985). In other
countries, experiments in work organisation were undertaken in an attempt to break
the culture of employment instability (eg. Volvo's redesign of work at its Swedish
plants, Berggren 1992), and in others, pursuit of specialist high value added market
niches might avoid the worst fluctuations and so provide employment stability as a
basis for higher skill development (Mendius and Sengenberger 1976). However, none
of these partial solutions appeared to resolve the underlying problems of employment
instability, alienation, and low levels of skill.
It was a classic 'low trust' system. Power relations dominated in the work place as
workers were often well-rewarded compared to alternative jobs, but also often easily
substitutable because training times were mostly short. In its heyday, it was a
formidable engine of job creation because its growing demands could so easily be fed
workers from other backgrounds, such as the former agricultural workers and 'guest
workers' in many European countries. The one big advantage of the culture of
employment stability and relatively high labour turnover was that such production
systems were very effective recipients of new workers. It also provided a staging post
on the way to better jobs for many poorly qualified young workers who gained first
jobs in unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing (as happened in France, Clémenceau
and Virville, 1981).
Flexible specialisation
A first major change in the system arose with the emergence of a new generation of
electronically controlled machine tools which could be re-programmed to carry out
other operations much more easily than the dedicated equipment of classical mass-30-
production (Piore and Sabel, 1984). This had two profound consequences for the
organisation of mass production that then existed: first it radically altered the nature
of scale economies, away from production, and towards R&D and marketing; and
secondly, it shifted the basic assumptions of work organisation. 'Flexible
specialisation' of capital goods meant that workers' jobs and skills would have to be
more varied. 
In the future, small-scale production would have a much greater part to play in
industrial activity, a prediction which receives some support from the growth in the
employment share of small firms in many countries during the 1970s and 1980s
(Sengenberger, Loveman, and Piore 1990), and on the labour side, Piore and Sabel
envisaged the emergence of a kind of 'neo-craft' type of production as an alternative
to mass production, and modelled on the industrial districts of small firms in
northern Italy.
Piore and Sabel's predictions concerning the future evolution of mass production
have attracted less agreement than their diagnosis of its likely decline. A more
general typology of scenarios was offered by Sorge and Streeck (1988) who stressed
the importance of economies of scope arising from the new microprocessor controlled
technology. 
Economies of scale and scope
Reviewing some recent research on new management models of production Sorge
and Streeck (1988) argued against the view that technical change drives changes in
work organisation. Instead, they stressed the importance of managerial choice, and
the way in which new microelectronic technology had opened up new possibilities
not so much in terms of control of labour as in terms of new product market-31-
possibilities. In particular, they argued that new technology has favoured the
development of quality market niches in a number of formerly mass markets. By
offering greater flexibility in capital equipment, and thus greater scope for product
variety, new technology has opened up a new future for the highly skilled workforces
of countries such as Germany and Sweden. As economies of scope offer an
increasingly viable alternative to economies of scale, they argue that taylorist, low
trust, mass production systems need not necessarily chase out highly skilled flexible
production systems. In terms of Figure 1, new technology has opened up the
possibility of diversified quality production as an alternative market niche to high
volume standardised production. They justified their argument on the success of the
high quality end of the German automobile industry during the 1980s (Streeck 1985).
Figure 1. Typology of production systems












One of the main employment implications Sorge and Streeck wished to stress was
that there was no single logic of technical change that was pushing firms towards
either progressive deskilling of labour, nor any necessary tendency towards a
polarisation between an army of deskilled workers and a highly skilled élite. Both-32-
views, they argued, were based on the misconception of assuming that the logic of
mass production still prevailed. In fact, the purpose of their typology was to suggest
that management would choose its technology according to the type of product
market it was targeting. The economies of scope offered by new technology
introduced a new dimension to their choice.
Lean production
The third set of changes relate primarily to management rather than technology, that
is the rise of 'lean production'. This management innovation has no doubt been
facilitated by new technology, but it is first and foremost a revolution in management
thinking comparable in importance to that which accompanied Ford's perfection of
mass production in the 1920s (Womack et al. 1990). To emphasise the point, the
authors' paradigm example of lean production was that of Ohno's reorganisation of
die changes for stamping car parts at Toyota in the early 1950s, and it involved only
reorganisation using existing technology (the presses were second hand ones from the
US).
The mass producers would set up the presses to produce long runs of particular parts
in order to gain scale economies because of the extreme precision needed and the cost
of die changes. In the early post-war period such runs might even last for years.
Ohno perfected a means of rapid die changes, such that by the late 1950s they could
be done every three minutes, thus avoiding the need for capital tied up in large
inventories, and cutting rectification work because quality problems became
immediately apparent instead of after a large run had been completed.
Making such a revolutionary idea effective entailed a number of other equally
important organisational changes. For example, large buffer inventories also protected-33-
the flow of production against poor labour relations, high levels of labour turnover
and absenteeism, and general lack of employee interest in the job: all well-known
features of mass production systems. To understand the depth of the organisational
change involved, it is worth reflecting briefly on the way mass production systems
have been managed.
Mass production was based on a strict division between conception and execution;
in design work on a high degree of functional specialisation; and in supply, on a tight
market relationship between the assembler and its suppliers. Although highly
efficient compared with the craft production systems it displaced, it nevertheless had
a number of weaknesses which have come to assume greater importance as
workforces become more educated and more demanding of their work, and as
consumers demand more reliable and better quality products.
It was a rather rigid system as concerns patterns of labour utilisation at most levels,
and in capital use. Some of the rigidities in labour utilisation were accentuated by
organisational dysfunctions and patterns of job control which developed in its work
forces. In particular, Womack et al. (1990) stress the informational diseconomies
arising from the prevalence of bargaining relationships at every point of transaction
in the system, between workers and supervisors, different functional departments,
assemblers and their suppliers, producers and customers. As a result of these
relations, each party has an incentive to withhold information as this is the source of
bargaining advantage. This causes a failure to achieve high rates of cooperation, and
the innovation gains that can flow from information sharing.
Mass production coped with economic and organisational uncertainty and change by
building up buffer stocks, and it coped with de-skilled, discontented, workers by
narrowly defined and easily monitored jobs, tight supervision, and financial-34-
incentives together with an army of staff engaged in quality inspection, and fault
rectification. However, although buffer stocks enable a complex production process
to keep going despite problems of quality and coordination, they also hide the causes
of these problems.
Figure 2. A simplified view of the logic of lean production.
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The essence of lean production follows from the elimination many of the expensive
safety nets used in mass production, and the consequent exposure of organisational
failures. Without buffer stocks, and costly managerial control mechanisms, the
problems that caused delays on the production line are exposed and have to be
resolved quickly. This implies that managers and workers need suitable work
organisation patterns, skills and motivation to tackle these problems. With lean
production, demotivated managers and distrustful workers have a far greater power
of disruption. Hence, 'lean production' is above all a method of management, and a
way of tackling organisational and technical problems directly, as they emerge. Some
of the linkages between its key human resource features may be set out as in Figure
2.
Lean production and the level of employment
It is clear from the presentation of lean production that it is a much more economical
way of using all kinds of resources to produce large quantities of goods. Whether it
really can use 'half the human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half
the investment in tools, half the engineering hours to develop a new product in half
the time' (Womack et al. 1990 p.13) as compared with mass production may be
exaggerated. However, a glance at some of the productivity comparisons and
automobile and supplier performance data assembled by their study suggests that
European producers especially face a very profound restructuring.-36-
Table 1. Assembly plant productivity: volume producers hours/vehicle
J/J J/NA US/NA US&J/E E/E
Best 13.2 18.8 18.6 22.8 22.8
Weighted 
average 16.8 20.9 24.9 35.3 35.5
Worst 25.9 25.5 30.7 57.6 55.7
J/J: Japanese owned plants in Japan; J/NA: Japanese plants in N. America; US/NA:
US owned plants in N. America; US&J/E: US and Japanese owned plants in Europe;
E/E: European owned plants in Europe.
Source: Womack et al. 1990, p. 85.
Unlike many such productivity comparisons, those of Womack et al. deserve special
attention because they collected their own data, and could therefore eliminate many
of the causes of non-comparability. Given that European workers aspire to similar
levels of real wages to those paid in the US and Japan, these productivity differences
mean that European automobile producers have still to seek very substantial
increases in productivity. They are striving to do so, and many are seeking to
implement key features of lean production identified by Womack et al. (eg. Ford,
Peugeot, Renault, and recently Mercedes).
Moreover, these changes are unlikely to remain confined to the car industry, and are
rippling out to the supplier firms. The pressure to do so, and the scale of
organisational change required in Europe is again highlighted by comparisons of
supplier performance by Womack et al.
Table 2. Indicators of supplier performance
J/J J/NA US/NA All 
Europe
Die change times (minutes) 7.9 21.4 114.3 123.7
Lead times for new dies (weeks) 11.1 19.3 34.5 40.0-37-
Job classifications 2.9 3.4 9.5 5.1
Machines/worker 7.4 4.1 2.5 2.7
Inventory levels (days) 1.5 4.0 8.1 16.3
No. of JIT deliveries 7.9 1.6 1.6 0.7
Parts defects/car 0.24 na 0.33 0.62
J/J: Japanese owned plants in Japan; J/NA: Japanese plants in N. America; US/NA:
US owned plants in N. America; US&J/E: US and Japanese owned plants in Europe;
E/E: European owned plants in Europe.
Source: Womack et al. 1990, p. 157.
However, the problem posed to European producers is not just one of catching up.
Lean production, as analysed by Womack et al. is also a formidable heuristic device,
continuously seeking out new areas for improvement. Cutting inventory exposes new
organisational weaknesses. Earlier research in the mid-1980s tended to present the
problems of the US and European industries as primarily one of closing the huge
productivity gap which had developed during the 1970s.    What they overlooked
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was the new productivity dynamic developing across the industry. The nature of the
pressures on European producers emerged in the debate in France between the then
Minister of Labour and the CEO of Peugeot, M. Calvet, over the use of successive
'social plans' for lay-offs by Peugeot. Peugeot insisted that it had to cut jobs, despite
being profitable, because of the slack market, and in order to maintain its target of
a 12% annual productivity growth rate. BMW announced similar productivity growth
targets for its operations in June 1994. 
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If one follows the analysis of Womack et al. other European producers are in the
same situation as lean production is already much more firmly established in Japan
and North America.
Lean production and the structure of employment.
The main changes in the structure of employment may be summarised as follows:-38-
- less semi-skilled production jobs
- less supervisory and 'control' jobs
- less routine engineering and design jobs
- more long-term employment
- more multi-skilling
- less professional and more company skills
- a reinforcement of internal labour markets
- more devolution of decision-making
Once again, although many such structural changes have been related to the
introduction of new technology, they are also dictated by the organisational principles
of lean production, with or without new technology.
The Aoki/Koike model
Aoki's contrast of the J-firm and the A-firm, both stereotypical representations of
certain types of large Japanese and American firms sheds important light on some of
the inter-relationships between some of the guiding ideas of new management
practices. His argument builds on the field studies of Koike a number of which
sought to evaluate the contribution of patterns of employee management found in
Japanese firms to their productivity advantage over similar firms in other countries.
Koike's comparisons are important because they spread outside automobiles to such
industries as cement, car batteries and machine tools (Koike and Inoke 1990, and
Koike 1988). Although these industries may not be following all the principles of lean
production developed in the automobile industry, they nevertheless incorporate many
of the associated work organisation practices which Womack et al. argue play a
central part in its successful application.-39-
The main thrust of Aoki's argument is that 'horizontal coordination' in large
production units can be at least as effective as the more traditional 'hierarchical' type
found in the typical American mass-production firm. Whereas hierarchical
coordination relies upon the creation of specialist coordination functions within the
enterprise, and therefore a fairly heavy hierarchy of managers and supporting
specialists, horizontal coordination does away with a large part (but not all) of the
hierarchy, and relies much more on direct coordination between workshops and other
functional groups within the enterprise. Rather than centralise information in the
managerial hierarchy, much more of it is shared among these groups.
The standard economic analysis of hierarchical coordination shows that it is indeed
more efficient than alternative models when the amount and variety of information
to be handled is relatively simple and predictable. Such arm's-length communication
copes well with large numbers of standardised pieces of information. Where it loses
is when the richness of information needed to resolve certain work or coordination
problems is critical to finding speedy and effective solutions. Then there are gains to
solving problems at the point at which knowledge and understanding of the issues
are greatest, that is, within the workshop or work team.
To make horizontal coordination work effectively however, three preconditions must
be met: the workers involved must have an adequate level of technical knowledge;
their understanding of each others' jobs must be broad enough; and the incentives
must be such that groups do not use their greater access to information for their own
'selfish' bargaining advantages vis-à-vis either other groups, or management.
These three conditions have important practical policy implications: first, horizontal
coordination is more demanding of the educational level of ordinary workers;-40-
secondly, breadth of knowledge is possible only if narrow specialisation is avoided,
and it is helped by job rotation; and thirdly, incentives must be right to encourage
cooperative behaviour and discourage 'free-riding'.
The importance of these ideas is easily seen when one considers that it is widely
believed that customer requirements are changing more rapidly, product cycles are
shorter, and the removal of trade protection means that established firms have to
respond to pressures from new competitors and their innovations more rapidly than
in the past. Thus Aoki's theoretical formulation of some of the insights derived from
Womack et al.'s intensive study of one sector further suggests that competitive
pressures on firms will cause them to seek to develop greater horizontal coordination
in their own organisations.
The employment implications of Aoki's model depend very much on how
management solves the problem of selecting and motivating workers for effective
'horizontal coordination'. As under lean production, motivation of the incumbent
workforce is critical to its economic viability.
Motivation for workers within the 'J-firm' is provided by two chief mechanisms: a
ranking hierarchy in which good performance is rewarded by promotion; and a
'partial gift exchange' in employment. The ranking hierarchy allows merit to be
rewarded by promotion since ranks are divorced from functional positions, and are
more akin to status positions than particular sets of jobs. Higher ranks nevertheless
usually incorporate recognition of the ability to undertake an increasing range of
work tasks under job rotation.   The system also facilitates flexibility of work
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assignments as pay is tied to rank and not to individual jobs. However, one incentive
to be a good team player is the hope for promotion to a higher rank. The 'gift
exchange' offers higher effort in exchange for job security and a higher level of pay  .
14-41-
The employment implications of Aoki's model can be summarised as follows:
a) recruitment of educated workers for long-term positions (because of the need for
flexibility and a good learning capacity);
b) long-term employment for those where group learning and job flexibility are
critical;
c) status division in the workforce between those where motivation and skills are
critical, and those where they are less so;
d) exclusion of mid-career job-changers from the 'core' workforce;
e) the 'non-regular' positions may be more open to mid-career job-changers and the
unemployed;
e) long tenure-earnings profiles may facilitate low entry rates of pay for new workers,
so young workers may not be excluded (v. debate between Sako (1991) and Marsden
and Ryan (1991);
f) the shared interests between management and the core workforce may lead to
higher investment in capital equipment and slower employment growth in order to
generate rents which can be shared with core workers (a common problem in the
economics of self-managed firms);
Although Aoki estimates that even in Japan only one third of workers are in J-firms,
it is believed that the recent increase in average job tenure in Japan is a reflection of-42-
the spread of this type of employment system to smaller firms (OECD 1993 Ch. 4).
TQM as an extension of lean production in services
The development of Total Quality Management (TQM) is a broader concept than that
of lean production, but it shares a great many key organisational features (eg. Hill
1991). It has been spreading rapidly in the services, utilities, and the public sectors
of a number of countries. In the UK, the government's 'Citizen's Charter' for the
public sector embodies many TQM ideas, and such thinking has been influential in
recent reports on reform in the police (Audit Commission 1991, Sheehy 1993) and in
the universities (Fender 1993).
According to Hill, the TQM 'gurus' stress five main features of TQM: top
management should be the driving force behind quality; quality improvement should
be achieved within the vertical management structure, and make use of multi-
functional teams; incremental quality improvements should be taken on as a specific
management task; employees should be trained in systematic problem identification
and solving; need for cultural change in organisations. His own study further stressed
the role of middle management and of employee participation.
Other writers on TQM such as Walton (1985) and Lawler (1992) have stressed the
shift from management use of 'control' to 'commitment' as the key motivational
factor, using 'stretching' performance standards and a flatter managerial hierarchy to
guide the organisation, and employee involvement and a measure of job security to
increase employee commitment.
Whereas lean production appears tied to manufacturing type activities, TQM is a
movement that has been taken up a wider range of organisations, including the-43-
services sectors and the public service.
There are some notable areas of overlap with lean production. The emphasis on top
management's design of organisational systems to force quality issues into the open,
and the elimination of buffer stocks where appropriate have an important role, for
example, in banks and tax offices. Elimination of intermediate stocks of work (eg.
large piles of tax returns awaiting processing) can also be effective in quality
improvements in the services as customer complaints can bring quality failings to the
fore more quickly.
Perhaps the main difference of emphasis with regard to lean production is the
common stress in TQM on exposing staff to contact with customers. Just as
eliminating buffer stocks means that teams of workers have to be able to act quickly
to rectify a problem, and often without waiting for management intervention, so
direct contact with customers can only really be effective if staff have sufficient
discretion to make decisions without referring upwards all the time. Indeed, if they
had to refer back to their supervisors too often this would defeat the object of closer
customer contact.
Dealing with customer problems may also be quicker if staff can refer quickly to
others at the same level without passing through the management hierarchy. They
are also likely to be more effective if their functions are less compartmentalised as
customer problems often spill over the sectional boundaries within organisations.
Hence, one can expect the equivalent of team working under lean production within
TQM.
All the above three approaches, lean production, the 'J-firm', and TQM place a heavy
emphasis upon commitment by employees to their organisation's goals. Walton (1985)-44-
argues that such commitment can only work if reciprocated: organisations have to
show similar commitment to their employees. Often this is taken to mean a
commitment by the firm to stable employment, yet this is costly, as is illustrated by
the research of Foulkes and Quinn Mills.
Foulkes' case studies of non-union firms offering employment security suggested that
management saw this policy as underwriting their policies to foster employee
commitment. Several of his examples show that firms were prepared to incur
considerable opportunity costs in order to sustain their commitment to their
employees. In one example, a firm decided not to take on a large contract because it
would have meant taking on a large number of temporary staff, which would have
undermined its reputation for stable employment (Foulkes 1980, p. 100). In a survey
of some major firms' programmes to maintain employment security during the 1980s,
Foulkes (1988) again highlighted the costs involved in use of supplementary
workforces, separation incentives, redeployment, expanded personal leaves, and work
sharing.
Another example, analysed in depth, has been the cost that IBM was prepared to
incur in order to maintain its reputation for employment security despite a major
reduction in the size of its operations (Quinn Mills 1988).  The company retrained
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and redeployed over 20,000 employees from 1986 to 1988. 9,000 were transferred from
manufacturing and product development into sales, programming and engineering;
7,600 left customer support and headquarter assignments to return to work directly
with customers; 4,000 moved to other locations to do jobs similar to those that they
had been doing because the old location division had been closed or had its purpose
changed.
Quinn Mills' (1988) study of IBM, provides some evidence of effective reciprocity-45-
between the firm and its employees. After interviewing many IBM employees he
reported that full employment practices had earned the loyalty of employees.
Interviewees told him that they were willing to put in extra commitment for a firm
they thought they could trust. The company also saved some of its investment in
skills and in building up a strong culture and set of business practices among its
employees. It would be interesting to know whether IBM has been able to sustain
such attitudes during the more recent restructuring.
In these examples management saw the employment practices as designed to elicit
commitment and related patterns of behaviour among employees. They entailed
reciprocity. A firm acquires a reputation for stable employment among its employees
by the economic cost it shows it is willing to incur to sustain that reputation. Never
to have laid anyone off proves nothing of itself: the firm may never have needed to.
One does not acquire a reputation for honesty simply by never lying, but by telling
the truth when it would be to one's advantage not to do so.
Some evidence the the extent of management practices.
Evidence on the extent of TQM is fragmentary, and mostly linked to individual
practices, but not employment security. Something can be gleaned from a number of
sources including surveys of employer practices; indications of causes of change; data
on employment change of those groups of employees most likely to be affected (ie.
supervisors); and evidence on job tenures.
a) survey evidence of management practices.
A recent survey by Lawler et al. (1992) of Fortune 1000 companies in the United
States indicated that three quarters of the firms in their sample had introduced some-46-
TQM practices, although the survey did not enquire about stable employment. It was
also clear that only about one fifth of the firms had done so for 40% or more of their
employees. What was striking in their results was that many firms which had
adopted some TQM practices appeared to have adopted a wide range of them. Firms
that were heavy users of TQM tended also to be heavy users of employee
involvement. This would be consistent with the idea that the firms were adopting a
coherent package of policies, rather than acting in a piecemeal fashion, although it
should be said that 'heavy user' firms were in the minority. 
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Table 3. Percent of employees covered by TQM practices in 1990 (United States):
None >40%
% of organisations
Direct exposure to customers 4 24
Self-inspection 10 25
Work simplification 13 22
Cost-of-quality monitoring 18 22
Collaboration with suppliers
in quality efforts 13 19
Just-in-time deliveries 24 21
Work/manufacturing cells 41 13
Based on the 77% of Fortune 1000 firms using TQM practices.
Source: Lawler et al. (1992, Tab. 16.1).
Evidence for the UK is less clear-cut, largely on account of the data. Reviewing such
evidence as could be gleaned from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey,
Sisson (1993) showed that there had been an increase in employee communications
programmes, financial participation, and a strengthening of the personnel function,
together with a decline in employer organisations. But as he argued, these were only
'fragments' of new management approaches so it was impossible to tell whether
adoption of such policies was part of a strategic approach by management or simply
piecemeal change. Again, there was no question about employment security.-47-
In France, by 1992, Coutrot and Paraire (1994) report that a third of plants had quality
circles (about two thirds in those with more than 500 employees), over two thirds had
workshop and office briefings, a third had employee expression groups, and the
majority of plants provided employees with information on a wide range of business
and employment information. 
Recent survey and case study evidence from northern Italy suggests similar
developments there (Ambrosini 1991). Management have taken a more active role in
developing the 'human capital' of firms, and spending less time on traditional union
bargaining issues. They appear to be stressing training, recruitment and selection,
communications programmes, motivation, and more generally, transforming quality
circle initiatives into a more systematic approach to quality management. Survey
evidence from Regalia and Ronchi (1989) suggests that these movements have
attained considerable depth, at least in northern Italy, and in large firms. For
example, about one third of large firms reported having quality circles, and in a third
of these they involved more than half of the employees.
Nevertheless, Ambrosini raises important questions about these developments,
notably whether firms have fully thought through the requirements of employee
commitment-based motivation policies in terms of job security, and whether they
have really taken account of the difficulties of offering such conditions to only part
of their workforces. Thus, as with the British evidence, there is some question as to
how far these are strategic initiatives forming part of an overall programme of change
in the enterprise, and how far they are piecemeal changes.
It is of course possible that a gradual accumulation of incremental changes will bring
about a qualitative change in the underlying logic of employee relations. As few-48-
human resource managers start with a blank sheet, in most firms, change has to be
introduced in a piecemeal fashion, whether management has an overriding strategic
vision or not. However, it is also possible that incomplete reforms will be dominated
by the prevailing logic of adversarial employee relations.
b) evidence on management objectives
It is hard to assess the significance of such statistical evidence on the incidence of
individual practices without some indication as to management's objectives. Without
this, the picture will necessarily be fragmentary. Two clues as to motivation may be
gleaned from the survey evidence: the causes of change; the emphasis on
reorientating employment relationships; and employment security.
The first is that where the question was asked, increased competition and product
change have been influential (in Lawler: foreign competition; and in Regalia and
Ronchi: competition generally). These were indeed the pressures for change in the car
industry industrial relations in the US and the UK in the 1980s (Katz 1985, Marsden
et al. 1985). Lawler et al.'s survey found additionally that firms also adopted them in
order to cope with shorter product cycles. The consequent need for frequent
reorganisation and flexible working push management to look for alternative means
of gaining consent. In their survey, firms facing stronger foreign competition and
shorter product cycles reported using Employee Involvement (EI) programmes to
help in a number of activities, including  restructuring management for more
devolved decision-making, and improving management-union relations.   Thus some
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of the pressures driving the spread of lean production appear to be influential in the
spread of TQM practices.
The second is that in the US, Britain, France, and Italy, many of these new ideas have-49-
in fact been introduced in unionised workplaces. This may seem surprising because
their ethos, as stressed by many gurus, is that of refocusing management-employee
relations on individuals and work groups at the expense of the union.  However, it
has been argued that management has been seeking to transform employee relations
in a direction more compatible with new production and service concepts. Such
moves may have received greater attention in countries such as the US, Britain,
France and Italy because of the tradition of adversarial management-union relations.
c) flatter hierarchies and less employment of supervisors:
One of the key predictions of TQM in the shift from management by control to one
based on employee motivation, or 'commitment' is that the proportion of employees
engaged in supervisory and monitoring tasks should diminish. Cappelli and
Rogovsky (1994) examined the effect of 'high performance' management on skill
requirements in a small sample of US organisations. The high performance systems
placed greatest demands on 'workplace competencies', that is, the ability to allocate
resources, interpret and communicate data, understand and improve equipment,
select and apply equipment), and rather less on interpersonal skills, and least on basic
educational skills. They also observed a bigger rise in skill requirements for
production and clerical than for managerial workers, interpreting this as a sign of
increased devolution of responsibility to the former groups.
The British New Earnings Survey provides some evidence of a decline in employees
engaged in supervision and inspection during the 1980s. In a number of blue collar
industrial occupations, the share of supervisors and foremen decline by between a
fifth and a quarter. The employment share of inspectors and testers also declined
sharply. The significant exception was construction, the activity in which lean
production and TQM have arguably made the smallest inroads, where the was-50-
virtually no change. 
18
Table 4. Percentage of foremen and supervisors in their respective occupations
1981/83-1988/90.
Occupational group. 1981-83 1988-90
XII Materials processing (excl. metals)
Foremen % 7.69 5.51
XIV Processing, making repairing 
(metal & electrical)
Foremen % 7.26 5.51
XV Painting & repetitive assembling
Foremen % 5.61 4.50
Inspectors and testers % 15.35 12.52
XVII Transport operating, materials moving etc.
Foremen % 5.15 3.89
XVI Construction, mining & related
Foremen % 10.84 10.69
Source: New Earnings Survey, based on sample numbers, full-time adult males.
d) job tenure and greater accent on internal labour markets:
A prima facie indicator of increased use of management policies based on
employment security would be an increase in job tenures among the workers
concerned. Such data are subject to many provisos. Comparisons of job tenures over
time may be affected by demographic changes, alterations in the employment
structure, and by levels of recruitment and lay-offs.
A recent comparison of job tenures controlled for demographic changes by analysing
age-tenure profiles in nine OECD countries (OECD 1993). It confirmed the wide
extent of long term employment practices in all OECD countries throughout 1980s.
However, as concerns changes during the decade, most countries appeared to show-51-
some reduction in average tenures for workers in their twenties (except Japan), but
a maintenance, and even a small increase for older workers.   The strongest increases
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for older workers were in Japan, and to a lesser extent, Germany (OECD 1993, ch 4).
For males, the UK and the US showed a distinct weakening of the relationship for
older workers over 50. 
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Although lean production and TQM might require a basis of long term employment,
their spread would not necessarily be reflected in an increase in job tenures if the
firms in which they were introduced already had long tenures. US-style mass
production had built-in job insecurity in the form of seniority-based lay-offs, but
these were quite compatible with long job tenures for the more senior workers. Once
one had achieved a certain level of seniority, the probability of lay-off decreased.
Indeed, even in the US and UK automobile industries, long job tenures among the
more skilled blue collar workers were quite common, despite the industry's general
reputation for 'hire and fire'. 
Thus, apart from Japan, it would seem that if these new management practices have
developed, in many cases, they have done so among firms which already provided
longish job tenures. Rather than transforming firms from a 'hire and fire' model of
short tenure, they would have transformed management practices in firms which
already had a significant component of stable employment. If the theories are correct,
this would involve a shift of the basis for long term employment, and a change in its
underlying logic (away from restrictive seniority rules and towards reciprocity-based
policies). This interpretation is consistent with the observation that TQM practices
(see above) have often been introduced into unionised workplaces.
Taken with the UK evidence of a the decline in employment share of foremen, there
is tentative evidence that changes in the direction of TQM and lean production have-52-
affected a certain number of firms, and certain specific occupational categories. The
survey evidence on practices of Lawler and WIRS also indicates that strong forms of
these new management practices have been adopted mainly in a minority of firms.
This may not be surprising in view of the cost of the reciprocity by employers needed
to foster more cooperative employee relations. Only in Japan does there appear to
have been a marked spread of long-term employment during the 1980s. Elsewhere,
the spread in aggregate has been limited, but better evidence is needed before any
firm conclusions can be drawn.
Core periphery models
One theme running through all of the above models of emerging managerial policies
is that firms can make significant gains by providing long-term, stable, employment
conditions to a significant part of their workforces.   However, such guarantees are
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costly. They may be even more so if flexible deployment of labour between activities
involves training. There is therefore a tension between the increased overhead
undertaken by firms in offering stable employment, and the increased qualitative and
quantitative variability of product markets to which such policies are meant to
respond. One might therefore expect firms to seek to limit stable employment to
those employees whose jobs demanded it, and to retain more traditional employment
policies for the others. What the precise mix of policies would be is an empirical
question depending, among other things, upon the relative costs and efficiency gains
of one employment method compared with another. However, it is noteworthy that
such an exponent of the 'J-firm' as Aoki readily conceded that strong lifetime
employment applied only to about one third of Japanese workers.
One of the strongest recent statements that firms are moving towards a dualistic
system of employment was made by Atkinson and Meager (1986).   On the basis
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mainly of a study of the labour flexibility policies of about 70 large firms in Britain,
they argued that firms were seeking to develop a core workforce with stable
employment and functional flexibility, combined with a periphery of workers with
less stable employment conditions providing the firm with numerical flexibility. The
inferences drawn by Atkinson and Meager were strongly contested by a number of
researchers, notably Pollert (1988), Hakim (1990) and Hunter et al (1993), but the
fundamental idea behind their research has continued to attract interest, perhaps
because of the apparent convergence between their own observations and those of
the management policies and philosophies just reviewed.
The Atkinson and Meager model represented the 'flexible firm's' workforce as a set
of concentric rings, like those of an onion, with a core of employees enjoying stable
employment conditions in return from accepting functional flexibility in work
assignments, surrounded by rings of progressively less permanent groups who would
provide the firm with numerical flexibility.
The discussion of the A&M model has revolved around two basic questions. The first
was whether the differentiation of the workforce observed by A&M was anything
more than a cyclical variation in the employment conditions of weaker groups in the
labour market, and hence whether A&M had indeed identified a new model of
enterprise personnel policies. The second has concerned which categories of workers
belong to the 'core' and which to the 'periphery'. 
In the UK, Hakim (1990) and Hunter et al. (1993) found that only a minority of firms
(5%-15%) appeared to be adopting the dualistic model as a part of an overall human
resource strategy, and that mostly firms approached the use of non-standard
employment conditions case by case. Hunter et al. also found that segmentation
occurred more frequently between than within firms, perhaps because it was hard to-54-
apply different rates of pay to people doing essentially the same work. They also
found additionally that a number of their firms were considering returning to
standard employment relations for some of the groups because they had problems
of coordination and lack of commitment among groups employed on a short-term
basis. This suggests that, in practice, Atkinson and Meager may have underestimated
the hidden costs involved non-standard work relations. Hakim (1990) suggests that
UK evidence may not be typical of other countries because there are  fewer legal and
tax incentives for employers to segment their workforces there. 
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The evidence then on increased employment segmentation, like that on new
enterprise human resource strategies, suggests that strategic thinking, seeking to
implement new practices in a systematic and holistic manner, is characteristic of only
a minority of firms at present. But, as discussed earlier, there are severe limitations
on trying to measure firms' human resource strategies by means of questionnaire
surveys. In addition, if firms adopt reforms incrementally and by trial and error they
may not have an overall strategy, but still external pressures could be pushing them
in a consistent direction.
8. European unemployment and patterns of management versus those of Japan and
the United States.
Much of the discussion of employee management practices so far has stressed
elements that might be relevant to unemployment in all countries. It might seem
therefore that the outcome has been simply to add flesh to abstract theories of firms'
behaviour. This may be useful in itself as a guide to the areas in which firms might
alter their policies should they wish to reduce some of the side effects. However, a
closer analysis of the incidence of management policies across countries can be used-55-
to shed light on some of the more puzzling features of the international
unemployment experience. Data sources impose severe limitations on any such
exercise so any conclusions can be only tentative. Nevertheless, one of the features
about unemployment which has puzzled many observers is why it should be so high
and so persistent in many of the European Union countries. Bean (1994) shows that
in 1988, 55% of the unemployed in the European Union were long-term unemployed,
compared with 21% in Japan, and about 7% in the United States and in the Nordic
countries. Annual outflows out of unemployment were correspondingly lower in the
EU countries than in the other areas, and particularly the US where outflows are the
highest in the OECD area. Flanagan (1993) has argued that this might be explained
by a reluctance by firms to hire.
The most obvious candidates to explain such a pattern would be legal and agreed
redundancy provisions which make it expensive to lay people off, and unemployment
insurance provisions which enable people to remain unemployed for a long period.
Yet Büchtemann's (1994) survey of evidence on lay-off provisions, and Bean's (1994)
review of that on benefits both suggest that these could explain only a small part of
the European problem.
It has been suggested that insider advantages may be greater in the EU countries
than elsewhere (Blanchard and Summers 1986), and other work on individual
European countries such as the UK lends some support to this (eg. Nickell and
Wadhwani 1990).   The diversity of union strength across European Union countries
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is such that there can be no simple correlation between insider advantages and
unionism. In any case, Nickell and Wadhwani report that estimates of insider effects
for the Nordic countries are lower than for the EU countries despite their high levels
of union membership density.-56-
It is therefore worth looking at whether prevailing management practices in EU
countries add to the European unemployment problem, and whether these might
affect insider advantages. Three themes will be addressed:
a) the nature of the long-term employment commitment
b) the nature of flexibility of labour deployment
c) enterprise employee representation
a) management and long term employment
Comparisons for 1991 of enterprise tenures show the United States at one extreme,
with 6.7 years, and Japan at the other with 10.9 years. The major west European
economies range from near the US level to near the Japanese one, with the UK at 7.9,
France at 10.1, and Germany at 10.4 years (OECD 1993). The differences are of similar
rank but more pronounced if we take the percentage of workers with five or more
years' tenure: with the US at 38% and Japan at 63%.
Such summary statistics for national economies have to be treated with care because
of considerable variation for individual groups and industries. Nevertheless, they
show that the unemployment problem faced by European Union countries is unlikely
to be the result of employment stability alone: otherwise Japan's problems would be
more serious.
Table 5. Distribution of employment by current enterprise tenure 1991
United States UnitedFrance Germany Japan 
Kingdom
>1 year 28.8 18.6 15.7 12.8 9.8
_ 5 years 38.3 45.0 57.6 59.0 62.6-57-
Source: OECD 1993; Note: Japan 1990.
It might be objected that employment stability is only a problem if firms need to
adjust to fluctuating markets, and that Japan's growth has so far avoided the need
which has afflicted western Europe. However, overall economic fluctuations have
affected all these countries. For example, the standard deviation of changes in
production since 1961 is 6.7 in Japan, 5.5 in the US, and 4.8 in Germany (JEPA 1992,
p. 193). Despite these, Japan has sustained considerably smaller variations in
employment and labour input. Indeed, the speed of employment adjustment in
manufacturing has also been considerably slower in Japan than in the US, and also
slower than in Germany and the UK (JEPA 1992).
The sensitivity of employment to changes in output can be measured by means of
employment functions, taking the coefficient on output, and that on employment in
the previous period, the latter showing the degree of inertia in employment
adjustment (Brechling and O'Brian 1967). International comparisons by the ECE (1982)
and more recently by the OECD (1989) show the US and Japan at the two extremes,
with high sensitivity of employment to output changes and low inertia in the US,
with Japan at the opposite pole. The major European countries lie in-between,
consistent therefore with the evidence on job tenures reviewed earlier, subject to one
interesting observation:   Germany has the high job tenures of France and Japan, but
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in terms of flexibility employment levels it is closer to the UK and the United States.
Table 6. Sensitivity of employment to changes in output.
Output Lagged employment
1973-80 1981-87 1973-80 1981-87
United States 0.43 0.31 0.41 0.63-58-
UK 0.19 0.14 0.77 0.78
Germany 0.19 0.16 0.85 0.80
Italy 0.02 0.08 0.38 0.87
France 0.07 0.04 0.86 0.93
Japan 0.08 0.11 0.88 0.92
Source: OECD 1989 pp. 43-44
A recurrent theme in this paper has been that employment stability for a core group
of employees may depend upon there being other groups of employees which can
absorb employment variations. The same OECD study provides a crude illustration
of this in the overall percentage of short-tenure workers. These will of course include
also those who have been recently hired as potential long tenure workers, and may
also reflect employment growth. Nevertheless, the US again appears at one extreme,
and Japan at the other, with the three European countries in between. Thus, if
Japanese long term employment depended upon an army of short tenure workers,
it is no better endowed than the other European countries. The one notable
difference, potentially providing Japan with greater flexibility is the stronger
polarisation between men and women. The ratio of men's to women's average tenure
is 1.7, compared with 1.3 in the US, 1.5 in the UK, 1.5 in Germany, and in France, 1.1
(OECD 1993, Tab. 4.1).
b) Flexibility of work allocation
Employment security need not harm competitiveness if there is compensating
flexibility of work allocation within the enterprise. Unlike job tenures which can
easily be measured on a common scale, measurement of internal labour flexibility
within the enterprise should, ideally, be based on detailed case studies. Cole (1979)
illustrates how the precise definition of individual jobs in US firms stands in stark-59-
contrast to their diffuse definition in Japanese ones and therefore destroys any
significance of statistics on intra-plant job changes. There have nevertheless been a
small number of inter-country comparisons of internal plant organisation, and these
can be linked with fragmentary evidence from other plant-level studies.
The ability of Japanese management to redeploy staff, and to use flexible work
allocations and job rotation is well documented, although its extent across firms and
depth of use is hard to evaluate.   Koike (1988) provides evidence that many of the
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features of large firm employment, notably internally generated skills and flexible
deployment of labour between jobs are widespread also in small firms in most
sectors. Cole (1979) argues that the diffuse definition of jobs in Japanese firms is an
important factor in job flexibility as workers move between task assignments without
changing their 'job', compared with the close identification between work task and
one's job in US factories. 
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Osterman and others have argued that prior to the shake-up of the 1980s, internal
labour markets in the US tended to have very detailed job classifications and narrow
job boundaries which proved to be a major obstacle to the internal redeployment of
labour. Although there have been considerable changes in seniority systems during
the 1980s, nevertheless, Katz's (1985: ch. 4) study of the introduction of new working
practices in the US auto industry highlighted the persistence of problems related to
seniority and job assignments as well as the refusal of some skilled groups to enter
into team working. Thus, the seniority-type mechanisms which have enabled US
employers to lay-off and rehire workers with relative ease, and which have
contributed to their high rates of in- and outflow from unemployment, appear to
have persisted.
Turning to the European countries, most of the bilateral comparisons show that the-60-
Japanese firms have greater freedom to redeploy labour internally. Comparing France
with Japan and Germany, Maurice et al. (respectively 1988 and 1986) highlight three
important areas: job category boundaries; supervisors; and polyvalence.   Narrowly
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defined job categories have proved a serious barrier to devolving greater autonomy
to blue collar workers, and have complicated the task of introducing new technology.
Who gets the programming work, for example, and how it is fitted into the existing
job classification is a major issue of contention. Should it go to the technicians who
have the overall knowledge, or should parts of it go to the shop floor where a quick
response can be provided? The sharp distinction between the functions of conception
and execution which also characterise French job classifications place supervisors in
an awkward position vis-à-vis new concepts of team work which effectively render
old fashioned supervisors obsolete. The same distinction also proved to be an obstacle
to the efficient flow of information within the cross-disciplinary areas of 'mecatronics'
as engineers' work lay on one side of the divide, and that of technicians, on the other.
The logic of French job classifications has also tended to impede new concepts of job
rotation, as is illustrated by Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre's (1982) analysis of
polyvalent workers in French and German firms. As a consequence of narrow job
classifications, workers attain their skill and work speeds by experience at the same
task. Those deployed to new tasks fail to reach the same speeds as more experienced
workers at those tasks, and so suffer a decline in earnings. As the skills are tied to
the work tasks, job flexibility is penalised. In contrast, the broader job classifications
of German firms enable employers to use task rotation as a means of broadening
workers' skills, and incorporate it into the training process. Hence, unlike in France,
polyvalency is skill enhancing and in the long run brings higher rewards.
British firms also contain strong organisational rigidities of work allocation as
compared with Japan (Dore 1973), although they are of a different nature to those
found in many French firms (Gallie, 1978, Eyraud 1981). They tend to segment jobs-61-
on an occupational basis within the enterprise with fairly strict lines of demarcation
as to which tasks fall to which occupational category. Although many of these have
been softened as a result of flexibility agreements and management implemented
changes, they remain influential. Many of these divisions have been attributed to
union action, such as job demarcation rules. However, they also correspond to the
wider economic logic of occupational and professional labour markets (Eyraud,
Marsden and Silvestre 1990). Dividing skilled from semi-skilled work, and
segmenting skilled work among different trades provides greater stability in the
structure of labour demand thus creating incentives for workers to invest in
occupational skills. Training for transferable skills also needs a high degree of
uniformity of job vacancies across different firms, something which is given by a
system of job demarcation rules. Union action may consolidate these, and sustain
them after they have served their productive function, but primarily they respond to
an underlying logic of skill organisation. They contrast strongly with the diffuse job
boundaries of many Japanese enterprises.
Job demarcation rules have notably entered into conflict with the different job
boundaries required by new technology (see §4.4 in the industrial relations chapter),
and with new the concepts of work organisation associated with lean production.
Rigid job boundaries are an obstacle to team working, and to the devolution of
certain maintenance tasks to semi-skilled workers. Indeed, they tend to perpetuate
the divide between skilled and semi-skilled, and remove some of the incentives for
the semi-skilled to take on additional training.
Functional divisions within many French and British organisations also militate
against flexible work organisation. On the basis of case study firms in France, the
Netherlands and the United States, d'Iribarne (1989) characterises the French firms as
dominated by a customary notion of non-interference in each other's work between-62-
different functional groups within the enterprise. Unwarranted interference would
violate the professional 'honour' of a group by casting doubt on its competence to
manage its own area of work. Such attitudes prevail both horizontally between
workers in different functions, and vertically between management and the groups
for which it is responsible. The logic of honour excludes routine management
interference in the work of different groups unless something goes wrong. This
pattern of inter-group relations was absent in his Dutch and US plants. Although
open to other interpretations, d'Iribarne's observations suggest a pattern of
management organisation which is very conservative. It is easy to see that if each
group has it own area of competence, then it is hard to move workers between these.
Evidence of similar rigidities within British organisations which go beyond those
associated with professional labour market groups are illustrated by recent research
on engineers where collective bargaining is much weaker, or non-existent. In a study
of engineers in Britain and Japan, Lam (1994) showed some of the barriers to job
rotation existing in professional work. Whereas the Japanese firms were able to move
engineers around so that they gained experience of the full product cycle from
conception to customer service, the British organisations were highly segmented by
function and by area of professional expertise.
Thus the dominant impression from a number of organisational level comparisons
is that organisations in France and the UK are segmented internally, partly by
occupational boundaries, but also by rigid intra-organisational divisions. There have
been numerous attempts in both countries to break these barriers down in recent
years, however, in most cases, progress would seem to have been limited.
Germany offers an interesting contrast with these two European countries.
Comparisons of both France and Germany, and Britain and Germany have-63-
highlighted a tendency, in Germany, for skill to be more based on technical
competence acquired through certified training than on OJT in particular job
classifications or professional categories (v. Maurice et al 1982, and Jacobs et al.
1978).   The broad-based technical competence underlying production skills has
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meant that the rigid division of conception and execution, and the fine job
classifications have been less prominent in Germany as compared with France. It has
also meant that skill could be more easily based on widely recognised training rather
than a form of job property rights as compared with Britain.
Moreover, it would appear that German firms have been able to build on the high
level of initial vocational training in occupational skills, adding further training which
is often more specific to individual firm's needs. The great majority of technicians and
foremen have been promoted from the ranks of qualified skilled workers (Marry
1993) providing thus good career opportunities for skilled blue collar workers.
Although an increasing proportion of technicians also acquire recognised diplomas
(44% in 1989), they do so with help from their employer (Géhin and Méhaut 1993),
so that although it is in theory transferable, such workers will normally have acquired
considerable ties with the firm by the time of their promotion. The other technicians
have skills which are not so widely recognised outside the enterprise. Thus, German
firms seem to have been able to build ILM structures upon a system of occupational
markets, giving occupationally qualified workers a strong incentive to accept internal
flexibility, unlike their British counterparts.
In terms of internal flexibility within the enterprise, then, German firms would
appear to be better placed than either their French or British counterparts, but what
cannot be said without similar detailed comparisons between German and Japanese
firms is whether these forms of flexibility are significantly more limited than in
Japanese firms. There are, however, some reasons to believe they are. First, although-64-
skills are more broadly based than in France or Britain, job rotation will tend to be
confined within occupational boundaries, and thus within functions, unlike in
Japanese firms. Secondly, skilled workers enjoy much more of an élite status in
Germany than in Japan as is illustrated by supervisory patterns. A two-plant
comparison by Jürgens and Strömel (1987) illustrates that whereas in the German
plant the supervisor would tend to come from the skilled group and to enjoy a large
span of control, in the Japanese plant, there was a whole hierarchy of working
supervisors reaching down into the work group. Their function is primarily to
support on-the-job training and to lead small group activities, two important elements
of work-force flexibility. Their function is not one of control.   Thirdly, although
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German unions have been active in developing their own proposals for team working
(Turner and Auer 1984), suggesting therefore an active dialogue with the employers
on this subject, they appear to be some way behind the Japanese. Finally, the
evidence of the plant level productivity comparisons from the automobile industry
of Womack et al. (1990) suggest that although German plants compare well with
those of other European countries, they lag behind those of Japan.
Thus, of the three European countries, Britain and France, and to a lesser extent
Germany, appear to lie in between the United States and Japan. They offer similar
levels of employment stability to those found in Japan, but encounter similar
problems of redeployment of workers to those found in the United States. Japan can
afford employment stability because of internal flexibility, and the US can afford
internal rigidity because of employment flexibility, but the European countries
reviewed here have the worst of both worlds. In the United States, employers may
maintain relatively high rates of hiring and lay-off so that unemployment durations
are relatively short. In Japan, the ability to redeploy labour within the firm gives
employers more flexibility with respect to their hiring policies. The somewhat rigid
structures within many European firms reduces the scope for redeploying labour so-65-
that proportionately more of the adjustment burden has to fall on hiring.
This combination of emloyment stability and lack of internal flexibility could
discourage employers from hiring new labour. First, it makes employment
adjustments more difficult because it is harder to use redeployment of staff as an
alternative. Secondly, if ILMs are fairly rigid, then it will make it harder for firms to
use such practices as job rotation to enhance skills and to develop the kind of broad
skills described by Koike. It therefore reduces the return employers can gain on
investment in long-term jobs relative to capital. It would seem that Germany does
better on this score than either Britain or France, but none of the three appears to
approach Japanese levels of internal flexibility. Finally, lack of internal flexibility may
reduce the ease with which temporary reductions in hours may avoid the need for
job cuts. When employers's demand for labour falls, it rarely does so evenly across
all categories of employee. Therefore, a uniform reduction of hours, which would
share hardship among all, would be limited by the category whose hours could be
cut least. Ability to redeploy staff across functions and job categories would reduce
this constraint, and so help avoid temporary job reductions.
Thus on three counts, it is likely that a combination of employment stability and a
lack of sufficient internal flexibility could discourage employers from hiring new
labour, and so contribute to the relatively high unemployment durations noted in EU
countries.
9. Management policies to combat unemployment
Much of the debate so far about the role of firms in the fight against unemployment
has proceeded on the assumption that, in a competitive economy, firms are generally-66-
pursuing optimum commercial policies which should work out best in the long run
for employment. If they are not, governments are unlikely to have better information
on which to advise them. Thus, it has generally been assumed that subsidies of one
kind or another would be required in order to compensate firms for the difference
between the private cost of measure to support full employment and the public gain.
Despite its exploratory nature, this review of the potential impact of a number of
employee management policies on unemployment suggests a rather different
approach. It has focused on a number of management practices which firms adopt
either unilaterally or as a result of individual level negotiation with employees. It
emerged that some of the most powerful reasons behind wage and hours rigidity
arose from problems in these relationships, and notably from problems of lack of
trust on both sides. Many of the internal labour market arguments stressed a similar
problem. The problem of trust relations extends beyond those between employers and
employees, and in the case of training for occupational skills, it affects the
cooperation among employers needed to support training for transferable skills.
Subsidies have little to contribute to the solution of such problems. In contrast,
promoting the conditions for 'cooperative exchange' discussed in the industrial
relations chapter have a great deal to offer. It remains therefore to explore these ideas
in connection with a number of policies.
It has often been argued that if wages were more flexible in response to labour
market pressures, and in particular, in response to fluctuations in firms' product
markets, then cyclical unemployment could be reduced. Because such lay-offs often
involve loss of firm-specific skills by workers, they can easily become the prelude to
entry into longer term unemployment. Because the spread of 'lean production' and
'TQM' practices is likely to strengthen firms' internal labour markets by increasing the
emphasis on organisation specific 'contextual' skills, difficulties of finding another-67-
skilled job are likely to become more serious.
Both strands of contract theory, implicit contracts and efficiency wages, highlight an
important link between wage fixity and problems of mutual trust between employers
and their employees. In the first case, a fixed wage was chosen because it was hard
for employees to rely on information from their employers about the state of business
because of the 'rewards for pessimism'. In the second case, efficiency wages, wage
rigidity emerged from the incentives set up by employers to ensure that their
employees did not provide sub-standard performance. Varying these incentives in
relation to product market shifts then encountered problems of how the employer
could convince employees of the good faith of statements about business conditions.
The root problem behind more flexible pay systems, in both cases, lies in the lack of
trust between the parties. It would be utopian to suggest that distributive conflict
between employers and employees could be abolished. What could be stressed,
however, is the need to reduce the area of distrust surrounding such relations.
If one reflects on the problems of making credible statements in which one's own
interest is involved there are a number of relevant examples. It was mentioned earlier
that for reasons of lack of suitable undisputed information on firms' results, the
French legislation on profit sharing had opted for profits as recorded in fiscal balance
sheets. This is a very rigid method, and one which separates results from the efforts
put into achieving them. However, in some countries, the giving of even
commercially sensitive information to employee representatives has been long-
standing. If pay is to be made more sensitive to a firm's business conditions, then the
information has to be available over a long period of time. Traditionally, trade union
bargainers used to complain that management only gave such information 'when the
cupboard was bare'. Such action was unlikely to boost confidence. On the other hand,-68-
in many large German and Japanese firms, management provide worker
representatives continuously with a good deal of important information, and consult
them on important investment decisions. As such, it becomes much easier for the
representatives to assess the good faith of claims made in hard times.
Wage flexibility is not a notable feature of German pay systems where other forms
of flexibility are important, but it is of Japanese ones, an important source being the
bonus system. Although the latter rarely drops below two thirds of its average level,
a number of studies testify to its sensitivity to output performance. When one
considers the opposition of employees in many firms to cuts in profit-related bonuses,
the apparently widespread acceptance of the bonus system in Japan is remarkable.
Although one can only speculate on the reasons for this, it is important to see it in
the context of the large amount of information sharing and cooperation between
Japanese management and enterprise unions that prevails in most large firms.   This,
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combined with the expectation of long-term employment for core employees, creates
an environment in which short-term concessions appear reasonable. The enterprise
union can vet the information provided by management because it is provided
regularly, and the long-term employment means employees stand to benefit from any
future improvements.
The problem of wage fixity may also harm the functioning of internal labour markets,
and in particular, reduce the extent to which labour may be redeployed flexibly
within them. The same process which makes for fixity also encourages detailed
linking of work done to pay rates, and so favours a proliferation of job classifications
and accompanying pay rates. Thus, it becomes harder to move staff around inside the
firm without crossing between job and pay classifications which, even in the absence
of unions, will generate a need for extensive individual negotiations. Apart from
discouraging such movements, it also reduces the extent to which job rotation can be-69-
used to broaden the skills of individual employees. The latter can help with the
redeployment of staff at times of economic difficulty for individual firms, and so
reduce the need to lay people off. It was also argued earlier that flexibility of working
hours depended upon the ability to redeploy staff between job positions, the reason
being that firms seldom need to reduce the supply of labour uniformly across all
activities. Thus, obstacles to the flexible deployment of staff within internal labour
markets can cause firms to seek bigger lay-offs than would otherwise be necessary.
Policies directed towards internal labour markets are likely to increase with the rise
of lean production and related management philosophies. The productivity gains
associated with broader-based skills, the development of diagnostic and elementary
maintenance skills among semi-skilled workers, active involvement of workers in
seeking production improvements and flexible allocation of labour are such that the
practice is spreading beyond the automobile industry and across countries. All of
these characteristics appear to favour further development of internal labour markets,
at least for those workers whose performance is critical to that of the firm. Thus,
despite the growth of self-employment and fixed-contracts in some sectors, it is likely
that internal labour markets will be reinforced in those sectors where employee
discretion is required. This raises two problems: the likelihood that insider pressures
will be enhanced, and that of reduced skill transferability.
The increased investment by firms in their workers' skills, and especially in
contextual skills related to the special competencies in which the firms specialise,
raises the gap between the value of employees' output and the total cost of hiring
them. Negotiation, whether collective or individual, over the resulting rents raises pay
above the competitive, market-clearing, equilibrium. It has also been widely argued
that the same pressures cause faster pay increases, thus forcing governments to run
the economy at a lower capacity.-70-
The reduced skill transferability associated with internal labour markets also adds to
unemployment problems. Although it might partially offset insider pressures because
the risk of giving up a skilled for an unskilled job will reduce the potency of
individual threats to quit, other bargaining tactics remain. Skill transferability is
partly a matter of the technical characteristics of the skills involved, but even more
important are the diversity with which the same tasks are combined and applied in
different firms, and lack of recognition. Occupational skills also contain an important
contextual element in all workplaces, but they remain transferable because firms tend
to organise their vacancies so as to accommodate such skills, and, even more
important, they are recognised by both the firm and the workers' peer group.
Encouraging occupational labour markets has much to contribute. By reducing the
gap between output value and total replacement costs they contribute to reducing
insider bargaining power. Employers can more easily replace workers with
occupational skills. Although this also reduces the cost to employees of quitting, the
size of gap over which negotiation may take place will be smaller. Secondly,
occupational skills may be transferred to other employer when a particular firm's
needs to cut its labour force. Thus individual and social waste of skills is avoided.
The contrast between skilled worker mobility in Britain and France was particularly
illuminating in this respect.
If occupational markets confer these important benefits, why are they not more
widespread? It was argued above (§ 5) that successful occupational markets
depended upon cooperation among employers because of the threat posed by free-
riding: employers who do not train themselves, but who take advantage of the skill
transferability conferred by occupational skills to poach those trained by others.
Cooperation with employee representatives is also important, as was argued in the-71-
industrial relations chapter (§ 3.5), because this increases the acceptability of sharing
the training costs with trainees. This reduces the incentive for some firms to seek a
free ride, and so reduces the demands placed upon inter-employer cooperation. A
highly successful example of employer-led occupational training is provided by the
German apprenticeship system. There, employer organisations play a critical role in
encouraging full participation by employers, and the support of unions and works
councils enables an effective system of cost-sharing through low apprentice
allowances. Although few can rival the strength of the German system for
occupational skills, many countries have such systems in certain sectors. Even Japan
has such a system in construction (Koike 1988). In addition, many countries have
built up experience in promoting inter-employer cooperation in training at the local
level. Therefore, there are many precedents, and many bases on which to build
without having to import one country's model.
At first sight there is a tension between the development of contextual skills as
encouraged by lean production and TQM, and the occupational path to reduce
insider and transferability problems. Such tension is of major importance to many
OECD countries because few offer the degree of employment security found in many
large, and medium-sized, Japanese firms. However, the German example again offers
some clues. Occupational skills can be broad-based and enable a good deal of job
rotation even though it may fall short of the Japanese level. It may also be possible
to build additional skills onto an occupational base. For example, the great majority
of German technicians started work as blue-collar apprentices and received additional
training after qualifying as skilled workers. The tension between the additional skills
and occupational transferability was eased in many cases by the additional training
conforming to publicly recognised standards.   Whether such a system can be fully
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adapted to the demands of lean production, or develop its own equally competitive
solution cannot be resolved a priori. However, encouraging cooperation among-72-
employers for the development of systems of occupational skills may be an important
alternative for countries where the group structure of firms does not enable such
extensive use of employee transfers to avoid redundancies as occurs in Japan.
Occupational markets may also help to limit some of the insider problems inherent
in strong internal labour markets, particularly where employers are unable to offer
the kind of long-term employment that is characteristic of large Japanese firms. In
Japan insider pressures may be moderated by the prospect of participating in the
firm's long-term prosperity, but with shorter term employment prospects in the
internal labour markets of many other countries, such countervailing forces appear
much weaker.
Thus, the main burden of this chapter has been to argue that finding ways of
promoting greater cooperation both within the firm and between firms can help to
reduce some of the rigidities in OECD economies which have contributed to the
current high unemployment problems. Management policies cannot resolve all of the
unemployment problems, but this chapter does suggest a potentially fruitful area for
further work in devising policies which neither involve additional subsidies nor
extensive government intervention.  -73-
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. Wall Street Journal 25.10.90, pp. B1, B5). Cascio drew two conclusions
     2
about employee opposition: that they felt powerless to influence profits; and
senior management in the fibres unit still managed to benefit from a company
wide bonus scheme.
. Data from the 1991 British Labour Force Survey reveal an intriguing
     3
phenomenon for this debate, notably, the high levels of unpaid overtime
worked in Britain. In 1991, employees worked an average of 7.09 hours of paid
weekly overtime, and an average of 7.32 unpaid overtime hours, Watson 1992.
The article did not make comparisons with earlier years.
. Often, such job rotation takes place over several years rather than within
     4
shorter periods. This increases the importance of long-term employment so
that job-rotation has the time to lead to enhanced skills.
. Notably iron and steel and shipbuilding. See Hazama H. Nihon Romu
     5
Kanrishi Kenkyu, translated by M. Sako as 'History of Labour Management',
Macmillan, Basingstoke, forthcoming.
. Osterman (1988, ch. 4) provides some tentative evidence of loss of morale
     6
among white collar workers in 'salaried' ILMs as a result of the recent wave
of employment reductions, but systematic evidence is lacking.
. For a fuller explanation of this argument see Marsden (1986 and 1990).
     7
. See for example: Noll et al. (1983) and Jones (1986).
     8
. Ryan's (1984) study of training for transferable skills in a US shipyard
     9
found evidence of employers doing just this. The most transferable and
valuable parts of the welders' training were given only at the end when the
workers were already well settled in the firm.
. Although hard to quantify, loss of 'morale' was one of the features
     1 0
identified by the labour market studies of Reynolds (1951), and more recently
by Bewley and Brainard (1993) as causes of a firm's inability to change its
position in the local labour market pay league.
. This was the case of both Marsden et al. (1985) on the British industry,
     11
and of Katz (1985) on that of the US. Both studies were linked to the first
Future of the Automobile Programme.
. Le Monde 19.1.93. Other articles at that period give more details of the
     12
debate. In June 1994, the chief executive of BMW announced similar
productivity growth targets (Financial Times 3.6.94).-85-
. The scale of such tasks varies between different types of work. In
     1 3
automobile production this may involve as little as being able to undertake a
wide range of tayloristic-type tasks (Koike), but in engineering, it can extend
to job rotation between departments such as R&D, production and marketing
(Lam 1984).
. This is derived from the restriction of employment in the J-firm and
     1 4
higher capital-labour ratios than would apply in a normal competitive firm. As
a result, the worker's marginal value product is less than the average value
product, and the difference can be used to pay a wage premium (Aoki 1988,
p.174).
. This study was of course carried out before the current crisis and
     1 5
restructuring of IBM.
. Use of Employee Involvement in Fortune 1000 firms in 1990:







Source: Lawler et al. 1992.
. The full set included eliminating layers of management, changing
     1 7
management style, improving union-management relations, move decisions to
lower in the organisation, broaden skill development and increase information
flow, improve management decision-making and health and safety.
. Because of employment reductions in the activities employing many blue
     18
collar foremen, it was decided to compare the numbers of supervisory staff
with those of other workers in the same broad occupational group, and whom
they might normally be thought to supervise. Because NES sample is only 1%,
it was decided to take the average for three years to minimise the effect of
statistical error.
. Demographic changes are controlled for by taking age-tenure profiles, but
     19
other changes in the structure of employment could affect the comparisons
over time and between countries.-86-
. A small part of the decline in the tenure patterns of older male workers
     20
may be due to the decline in employment share of supervisors as these are
mostly older workers.
. There are some theoretical alternatives, such as offering high pay to
     2 1
compensate for the higher cost of being dismissed. In theory, this would prove
costly, and in practice, workers' norms about pay differentials may make it
difficult for firms to offer high enough monetary rewards.
. There was a wide-ranging discussion of similar notions of dualism in
     22
firms' employment policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the US and to
a lesser extent in Europe around the notion of labour market dualism (see for
example Gordon 1972, Edwards, Reich and Gordon 1973, Doeringer and Piore
1971, and for the UK, Bosanquet and Doeringer 1972, and Germany,
Sengenberger 1978). Much of this discussion revolved around dualism in the
context of mass production whereby large firms engaged in mass production
offered relatively stable employment to semi-skilled workers in internal labour
markets, often regulated by last-in-first-out lay-off rules. Such firms sought to
capture the stable section of product markets, leaving small firms to work on
the unstable sections, and to act as sub-contractors for the large firms,
providing an additional buffer against market fluctuations.
. This evidence relates primarily to the UK, and it has been suggested that
     23
tax law and employment legislation in the UK provide few incentives to
differentiate employment status (Hakim 1990). However, recent calculations
by the OECD suggest that dismissal costs are relatively high in the UK,
although it also highlights the difficulty of such estimates (OECD 1993 Ch. 3
& 4).
. Nickell and Wadhwani summarised the insider weights as follows:
     2 4
Insider weight, lamda, in UK between 0.8 & 0.18, compare Sweden 0.04,
Norway 0.03, Finland 0, Germany 0.1, US 0.3, & Japan 0.33.
. A more detailed econometric study by Hashimoto and Raisian (1988)
     2 5
comparing Japan and the US confirms the lesser sensitivity of employment to
changes in output in Japan, and also highlights some important features of
hours and pay variability in relation to changes in output (Table 7.).
. For example, job rotation, although spreading, is not used in all firms. In
     26
1990, only 60% of firms with over 5,000 employees claimed to use the practice,
and a further 15% said they planned to introduce it. The figures were less for
smaller firms. Work transfers were widespread in large firms, but less so in
smaller ones. Across all firm sizes, just over 10% practice job rotation, and-87-
about 20%, work transfers (JEPA 1992, p.197, Ministry of Labour Employment
Management Survey 1990). It should of course be remembered that the
criterion of 'job rotation' is different in a country in which job boundaries are
relatively diffuse compared with one where they are narrow.
. It might be objected that Lincoln and Kalleberg's (1990) comparison of the
     27
US and Japanese workers does not fit this picture because Japanese workers
did not report their jobs as being any broader or more complex than those of
the US counterparts. This may be due to a misunderstanding of the nature of
job rotation in many Japanese firms which typically takes place over a fairly
long period of time. Thus the tasks undertaken by a Japanese worker at a
particular point in time may not be any more varied than those of her or his
US counterpart, but over time there is more movement, and in particular, more
potential for redeployment.
. A number of American writers have observed many similarities between
     28
the system of job classifications and its regulation in French firms and those
in US firms (Lorenz 1992, Osterman 1988, Piore).
. These observations have been further highlighted by a number of recent
     29
comparisons of training (Steadman and Wagner (1987, 1989), Campinos-
Dubernet and Grando 1988).
. They do not, for example, carry out employee performance appraisals. I
     30
am grateful to Professor Hazama for pointing this out to me.
. Concluding a review of research on the productivity effects of employee
     31
participation in decision-making, Levine and d'Andrea Tyson (1990)
highlighted the interdependence of participation and  related institutions such
as profit sharing, long-term employment, dismissal rights, and greater equality
of status and rewards. 
. See Drexel (1993). Formerly most technicians were promoted from skilled
     32
positions with experience and firm-based training, but now about half have
official technician diplomas on top of their apprenticeship training.